by Ismael Benkrama
written during Benkrama’s time at the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation in Beirut
This paper examines the impact of neoliberal urbanism on Positive Peace through an in-depth analysis of the rebuilding process of Beirut Central District after 1990. I will demonstrate, how neoliberal urbanism creates a privatized, controlled, segregated and securitized city-center in Beirut Downtown. Furthermore I will show how it creates a certain discourse around the reshaping of the urban that veils the true nature of the city development and creates a public approval for policies that benefit just a small, privileged part of the society.
Following Galtung’s approach to Peace and Conflict Research I argue that peace cannot be achieved by simply exterminating direct physical violence. Structural violence, often veiled by cultural violence, like discrimination, marginalization and restricted access to public goods should be considered as a state of conflict as well.
In 1990 the large-scale violence of the Lebanese Civil War ended and allowed for a rebuilding of the devastated central district of Beirut. Pressured by international financial institutions and weakened by the civil war, the Lebanese parliament tasked the private company Solidere, owned by the Lebanese billionaire and later Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, with the reconstruction of the area. By setting the legal framework to expropriate the whole district and transferring major decision making authorities to Solidere, the parliament paved the way for a reconstruction process that prioritized investment and accumulation-possibilities for international capital over preserving the history of downtown and its former function as a social fabric.
Introduction
In the 1960s Johan Galtung, a Norwegian sociologist, mathematician and political scientist, developed the theory of Positive Peace and laid the foundation of what would later become the academic discipline of Peace and Conflict Research. By extending the predominant conceptualization of war as a mere negative ‘absence of physical violence’ with the aspects of structural and cultural violence, he revolutionized our understanding of conflict and peace building. According to him, a society that is not in an armed conflict, still can suffer from hidden, structural violence like gender-based discrimination, racism or selective access to public goods.
Accordingly, the academic approach to study peace and conflict needs to include a wider range of disciplines to understand the manifold interlinks between various forms of structural violence, their veiling through cultural violence and the breaking out of direct, physical violence.
Galtung advocates for a multi-level and multi-disciplinary approach to Peace and Conflict Research that understands violence in its socio-economic and cultural context.
Traditionally, the city has always been an environment in which inequality and the subsequent structural violence show themselves most clearly. People from different classes and social backgrounds can live close to each other. Furthermore, cities are a sphere to negotiate conflicts and catalysts for social movements. Therefore, I argue that urban policies are a key factor to contextualize conflicts.
Neoliberalism has, more than anything, influenced the development and reshaping of cities since the 1970s and became the main approach to urban planning globally. By taking a wide understanding of ‘neoliberal urbanism’, including aspects from a sociologic, economic and political perspective, I will argue that neoliberal urbanism is an obstacle to Positive Peace in the sense that Galtung formulated it.
In his work on urban ideologies Theodore argues, that the manifestation of neoliberalism in the urban is always embedded in a socio-cultural and economic context[1]. This approach towards the required contextualization is similar to Galtung’s multi-level understanding of peace and conflict.
Theodore further points out, how the city has traditionally been a “laboratory for neoliberal policy experiments”[2]. The focus on urban politics therefore allows us to investigate Galtung’s Positive Peace concept and the manifestation of neoliberalism in the city itself.
Neoliberal urbanism is best summarized by Heeg as the creation of the ‘entrepreneurial city’[3]. It describes a nexus of policies that align the city, its architecture, its dwellers and the socio-cultural interaction it produces to a competitive market logic. The underlying principle is the deregulation of markets[4] and the capitalization of the urban to improve the structural framework for capital accumulation.
For my study I chose the example of Beirut’s downtown, a privatized, highly securitized and exclusive area for a high end clientele[5].
Destroyed in the Lebanese civil war, its rebuilding process since 1990 resembles the neoliberal policies that, in an attempt to be competitive as an international business location and attract foreign capital[6], represent the neoliberal creation of the ‘entrepreneurial city’.
By applying a broad understanding of neoliberal urbanism on Galtung’s theory of Positive Peace, this paper will try to show how the rebuilding of Beirut Central District is an obstacle to Positive Peace. To do so, I will first define both concepts in the way I intend to use them and suborder criteria for neoliberal urbanism to the three forms of violence (direct, structural and cultural violence) that Galtung identifies as part of conflict situations. Furthermore, I will give a brief historization on the rebuilding process and afterwards show how it prevents Positive Peace in the sense of Galtung.
Galtung’s concept of positive peace
Galtung’s theorization of Positive Peace is linked to his understanding of imperialism.
He identifies a global dichotomy between center-countries and periphery-countries as the underlying structure of international interaction. Center and periphery countries have a power gap between them. We speak of a conflict, once the interaction between center and periphery is utilized by the center to increase this power gap, be it economically, culturally or military[7]. This “disharmony”[8], is always accompanied by the creation of a “bridgehead” in the periphery-country. This bridgehead is a city whose interest align with the interests of the center to maintain a status quo in which the center profits from the economic exploitation of the periphery, while a small elite in the periphery profits from its role as a gatekeeper to their countries resources and labor capital[9].
This structure creates a second dichotomy inside of the periphery-countries between a marginalized, often rural and uneducated periphery and an isolated, wealthy and western educated, center[10]. Cities that want to benefit from the advantages, that the role of a bridgehead provides, are bound to engage in a competition with each other, that western center-countries set the criteria for. These criteria are usually the neoliberal policies, used to create an entrepreneurial city, providing optimized capital accumulation frameworks that I will list later on in this paper.
The analysis of this conflict structure leads Galtung to a new understanding of peace as well. Since a gaping dichotomy between a center and a periphery is not necessarily enforced through direct, physical violence, a widening of our understanding of violence is required. Galtung therefore distinguishes between three forms of violence that impede Positive Peace.
Direct violence is physical, verbal or psychological violence, intentionally directed at others. Victims of direct violence suffer from physical or psychological trauma. It is the predominant understanding of violence in the former understanding of war and conflict.
Structural violence can be political, repressive or economic. It is inherent to spaces and structures that prevent people from living as good as it would possible without the occurrence of structural violence and is being protected by structural fragmentation, segmentation and marginalization in a society.
Cultural Violence serves as the legitimization of structural and direct violence. It motivates actors to carry out direct violence and abstain from opposing structural violence. Discursive framing, religion, language, ideology and science can be utilized for cultural violence[11].
In conclusion, Galtung’s approach provides us with a new understanding of peace. The ‘negative’ understanding of peace as the mere absence of direct violence is replaced by the idea of peace as a state in which humans are free from discrimination and marginalization and are not being prevented from reaching their needs in society.
To understand the causation of this wide conflict-concept in a society Galtung proposes to take different spheres of social and political interaction into perspective[12].
In the following I will theorize and contextualize the neoliberalization of the urban and argue that it is crucial to understand conflicts.
Neoliberal Urbanism
Neoliberalism is a term that has been used by numerous authors to describe various phenomena and whose definition has not been agreed upon academically. The usage of the term ranges from the description of a political system, a form of governance and type of social interaction and human subjectivization to an economic system. In my approach to contextualize Positive Peace in neoliberal urbanism I will apply a wide understanding of the term and integrate the most frequently used aspects from recent literature on the topic to my methodology.
The introduction of neoliberalism as a term is connected to the following of the economic world recession in the early 1970s and the following shifts in economic and political policy ideology, particularly consolidated by Thatcher and Reagan[13].
Harvey, who wrote extensively on the connection of neoliberalism and urban geography describes neoliberalism as “a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. […] It must also set up those military, defense, police and legal structures and functions required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of markets. Furthermore, if markets do not exist […] then they must be create, by state action if necessary. But beyond these tasks the state should not venture. State interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum[14]”.
According to Theodore the shift in international economic and political theory from Keynesianism to neoliberalism was mainly a tool to justify the deregulation of state control over major industries, assaults on organized labor, the reduction of corporate taxes, the shrinking or privatization of public services, the dismantling of welfare programs, the enhancement of international capital mobility, the intensification of inter-locality competition, and the criminalization of the urban poor[15].
In contrary to a classical liberal ideology, neoliberalism refrains from a laissez-faire approach. Instead actors actively engage in the market to create framework structures that enhance smooth capital accumulation[16]. That process can be seen as a transition from the states distributive and protective left hand to the individualizing and disciplining right hand[17]. The state’s role in neoliberalism therefore is not diminished, but rather transfers some authority to market actors while becoming more authoritarian in its function as a framework-provider[18].
The manifestation of neoliberal ideology into the urban is strongly interlinked with the process of globalization of capital. Cities around the world have to compete with each other for foreign investment and skilled labor which pressures them to constantly improve their efficiency in capital accumulation and profit maximization. The enhanced possibilities of communication, trade-digitalization and liberalized international trade-regimes allow capital to freely choose investment locations.
Cities that do not provide competitive frameworks for capital accumulation will just be neglected for other cities that do, leaving them with minimized influence on a financialized economy that easily transcends national borders[19]. Without the means to influence this neoliberal market logic, national and regional governments often opt to adjust themselves to it.
Additional pressure on cities to transition their urban policies comes from the rollback of the ‘distributive state’. Neoliberalism diminished state funding and investment through the aforementioned austerity measures. Investment recipients are chosen individually on the basis of their competiveness as opposed to the broader spreading of funding under the former Keynesian ideology.
By applying a neoliberalism market logic, cities shift from a hierarchically organized “government” to a more coordinating ‘governance’. Through privatization the market is able to take over areas that were formally controlled by governmental administration. But the neoliberal urban governance still actively influences the economy. By coordinating political, social and economic interaction without interfering directly into them it provides a framework for smooth capital accumulation [20].
In the following I will summarize the variety of policies that enable this coordination. Following Galtung’s approach towards Peace and Conflict science I will include different perspectives on neoliberal urbanism and sum them up in five categories. Thereupon, I will assign each of them to one of Galtung’s violence typologies. Thereby, I will show how neoliberal urbanism in Beirut Central District reproduces all three forms of violence, causing a constant state of conflict and therefore has to be seen as an obstacle to Positive Peace.
The categories are separated by the aspects of the city they are affecting:
The privatized city is the epitome of neoliberal urbanism. To enforce a market logic on a city, it has to be accessible for the market as much as possible. Former public sectors and services, as well as public or state property, are commodified and turned into profit.
The controlled city influences social interaction and behavior of its inhabitants. Urban spaces determine how city dwellers live, interact, consume and even desire. Through the reconfiguring of these spaces, the city reproduces subjects that align with a smooth capital accumulation process. Therefore, these policies focus on a structural transformation with the aim to control human behavior instead of physical interference.
The segregated city is divided into areas of uneven privileges. It creates a bubble of wealth, only accessible by people it considers ‘desirable’. The marginalized dwellers of the city are prevented from entering the de-linked reality inside the bubble. This assures a ‘problem-free’ accumulation procedure without the interference of subjects that are unable to fit in. Furthermore, it allows the framing of the bubble as a clean, safe and homogenous area of consumption.
The securitized city is characterized by a strong presence of police, military and private security forces. They function as the physical safeguarding of the segregated city and the accumulation process. One the one hand, their presence prevents the interference (through protests, uprisings or crime) of the ‘undesired’ parts of society. On the other hand, the kind of security they provide is aimed towards the feeling of safety inside the ‘bubble of wealth’ to create an atmosphere that encourages consumption.
My fifth category will focus on the discourse that justifies neoliberal urbanism. Neoliberal transformation processes usually create strong opposition by groups that become disadvantaged by them. Therefore, a certain framing of the policies and projects is needed to guarantee a smooth transition process.
I will use examples for the privatized, segregated and controlled city to show the existence of structural violence in Beirut Central District. The securitized city will help me indicate physical violence while the discourse around neoliberal urbanism can be seen as a form of cultural violence.
Taking the example of Beirut’s downtown will help me to showcase the connections between Galtung’s violence-approach and neoliberal urbanism.
The History of Beirut Central District
The manifestation of neoliberal ideology in the urban cannot exist in a ‘pure’ form[21]. Aspects like segmentation and control are strongly interlinked with geography, architecture and infrastructure of cities and have to adapt to preexisting conditions to function smoothly. Furthermore, the privatization and the discourse around neoliberal urbanism depend on social and historical aspects. Therefore, a brief history of Beirut Central District is necessary for a more in-depth understanding.
The central district was among the first areas that got affected by the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975 and was severely damaged in the first years. Plans to rebuild it therefore date back until 1977 but never got realized due to the frequent outbreak of new fighting periods. The strategic position between the predominantly Sunni-Muslim west of the city and the predominantly Christian east led to the positioning of snipers in the surrounding buildings and resulted in the withdrawal of public life for 25 years. Without human interference, nature took over Beirut Central District. Trees and bushes started sprouting in the area, giving it the name ‘Green Line’.
Figure 1 The verdant demarcation line, downtown Beirut, in 1990. Marc Deville, 2019, Getty Images, Accessed: https://timeline.com/daily-life-continued-in-beirut-during-civil-war-37ad777d9ea8 07.08.2019
In 1983 the first outlines of what would later become the new city center was commissioned by the private engineering firm Oger Liban[22]. The owner, businessman and later prime minister of Lebanon, Rafic Hariri would stay in charge of the rebuilding process until his assassination in 2005.
The Taif-Agreement in 1989 formally ended the civil war. Despite the sectarian political system and the people in power staying in place, the end of military violence allowed for a start of the rebuilding process in downtown.
In 1990 the central district was devastated. Most buildings were either damaged or destroyed. Civil war refugees squatted the houses, tenant-landlord relations were complicated due to years without investment into the houses and the ownership of many buildings was unclear, since many former owners died of fled the country. Additionally, the state was weakened due to the civil war and seemed unable to tackle the rebuilding process[23]. Hariri’s offer to carry out the reconstruction without any state-funding and his reputation as a businessman convinced the government to set up a legal framework to privatize the rebuilding and put Hariri in charge of it. In 1992 he founded the Société Libanaise pour le Développement et la Reconstruction du Centre-ville de Beyrouth (French for “The Lebanese Company for the Development and Reconstruction of Beirut Central District), better known as ‘Solidere’.
The parliament set up an area that would officially become Beirut Central District and tasked the company with its reconstruction.
Figure 2 Demolition and preservation in downtown Beirut 1975–1998. Source: Heiko Scmid 1998, Schmid, Heiko. 2006. “Privatized urbanity or a politicized society? Reconstruction in Beirut after the civil war.” European Planning Studies 14 (3): 365–81.
The most significant power-shift towards Solidere was the passing of law 117. It provided the company with exclusive rights to expropriate the whole Beirut Central District and demolish the buildings. Former owners got compensated with shares in the company, based on a value assessment, the company did itself[24]. Its organization as a for-profit stock market company set the framework for the rebuilding. The need for constant investment of foreign capital resulted in a master plan that heavily favored profitability over the conservation of the former social fabric. With very few exceptions and regardless of rebuilding possibilities, all former buildings were demolished. Instead high clientele living space and office areas, shopping and finance buildings were the main objective after the rebuilding, creating a bubble of wealth, de-linked from its former function and its surrounding districts.
Critics of the master plan of Solidere pointed out early, that a reconstruction in this framework would exclude the possibility to reintegrate Beirut Central District into the rest of the city[25].
This assumption sums up the general approach towards the rebuilding. I argue that it was an attempt to neoliberalize the district and integrate it into global capitalism by de-linking it from the periphery of the city. To do so, I will show how the policies and plans regarding the rebuilding process mirror my categories for neoliberal urbanism.
Neoliberal Urbanism and Positive Peace
The privatized city
After the formal end of civil war in 1990 the World Bank and the IMF started framing the reconstruction process as a large-scale economic opportunity. Driven by a neoliberal ideology, they pressured for structural adjustments that could ensure market-driven growth. Without the privatization of the reconstruction process, business-friendly reforms and a structural framework to ensure capital accumulation opportunities, the future of Lebanon would be at jeopardy[26]. Without a big industrial sector or large raw material supply Lebanon was pushed to rely on its function as a ‘merchant republic’ to recover from the civil war devastation. The World Bank stressed that this function had to adapt to a globalized world by creating an internationally operating banking sector and a capital city that attracts foreign investments and companies. This neoliberal approach to post-war recovery laid the foundation for the reconstruction process of Beirut downtown.
The privatization of Beirut Central District was, as it is common for neoliberal urban privatizations, a selective one. While the state handed over all decision making powers and privatized the profit, the costs were still partly public. For example the municipality refrained from collecting any tax revenues from downtown during the first ten years. Furthermore, Solidere got a compensation for the infrastructure installations by getting allocated 600,000 square meters of land reclaimed from the sea.
As the neoliberal drive for profit maximization is only focused on profitable sectors, it is not ‘interested’ in cost-privatization. Heeg points out how the global trend to privatize former state sectors for the sake of efficiency only affects areas that the economy can turn into profit at that moment[27].
Companies utilize the power-shift from public to private, on which I will engage later on, to force the state into concessions that leave the public with the costs for private profit.
The most visible example of this power-shift and the accompanying ‘selective privatization’ are public-private-partnerships (PPPs). The government partly or fully transfers power, ownership and profit of a project to a private company and hopes for the necessary expertise and funding in return. These agreements mirror the core of neoliberal ideology, meaning that the market, freed from state-interference, is far more efficient than a bureaucratic municipality. The transition from state- to market-logic and the gain in corporate power regarding the decision making process excludes certain actors that lost their legitimization in the process. Since the idea of an infallible market is at the core of neoliberal ideology, a democratic decision making process is not at all regarded as necessary but rather as an obstacle[28].
Civil society groups or former tenants of Beirut Central District were left unheard during the construction of the master plan for the area. Decisions were made behind closed doors between representatives of private companies, a weak state and investors. This policy of exclusion sets a barrier for less privileged parts of society to influence the shaping of their city.
The privatization of land and a shift from rent-based housing to private ownership of houses is a common tool to enforce neoliberal urbanism. The eviction of former tenants and the promotion of the acquisition of land-property enhanced the commodification process that sets the basis for neoliberal market extensions.[29].
It is of no surprise that the reconstruction process started with the expropriation of land and buildings by Solidere. In 1991 the Lebanese parliament ratified Law 117, allowing to expropriate all land in the designated area of Beirut Central District and to compensate former owners with shares in the company. The estimation of the property values was carried out by Solidere itself, allowing it to set a price at which it can buy the property[30]. The commodification process of downtown was favorable for Solidere in two ways. First, without the forced commodification of most properties at the same time the price of land would hike through the reconstructing and value increase of the area. By giving Solidere the possibility to expropriate all of Beirut Central District before starting the construction and letting it set the price itself, Law 117 was a grave power-shift from former tenants and owners of the area to a private company. Secondly, the commodification was paid for in company shares. Therefore, Solidere did not need to raise funds for its purchases but forcibly turned the property value of former owners into an investment itself.
The eviction of an estimated 15.000 squatters and the expropriation of an estimated 100.000 claimants to land in Beirut Central District in favor of one company’s capital accumulation represent a form of structural violence. The legal framework shifts wealth, property rights and access to a whole city district from a large number of people to one company. The extensive scale and the lack of democratic justification mirror the power gap, created by neoliberal urbanism between large companies and the public regarding the influence on political decision making processes.
The privatization of Beirut Central District extends to the whole administration of the city. In the preface of Solidere’s annual report of 2004[31] it states that: The Company is establishing a solid base for BCD prosperity through high value-added land development activities, competitive real estate projects, as well as in its capacity as property owner and manager.
The district is handled rather as a private area of profit maximization than a part of a public city. Meaning that Solidere is not just monetizing land and buildings but also the management of the area. Through its subsidiary company ‘Solidere Management Services’ it provides the management of various aspects of maintenance in downtown to ‘relieve clients of property related issues’[32].
Solidere is the self-proclaimed largest provider of public space in Lebanon. The spaces are public in the sense, that their usage does not require any direct payment and range from archeological sites over a heritage trail to pedestrian walks[33]. The promise of accessible public areas was recurrent in Solidere’s advertisement for the rebuilding process. Angus Gavin, head of the Urban Development Division at Solidere, summarized the intentions behind the conceptualization of these areas during the annual City Debates at the American University of Beirut in 2006. According to him, high quality public spaces secure high land sales since everyone wants to purchase land adjacent to public space[34]. Since the real estate prices in Beirut Central District are among the costliest in Lebanon, the concept of public spaces is by no means aimed to satisfy the needs of the majority of Beirut’s inhabitants but rather those of a small minority that can afford the property and renting prices. This approach of semi-public spaces benefits Solidere in two ways.
On the one hand it helps to maintain its image as the rebuilder of a central district that benefits the whole country. On the other hand it monetizes public spaces and the value they add to surrounding properties. Privatizing the creation of public spheres raises the question, which kind of ‘public’ the designers consider desirable. In the case of Beirut Central District, Solidere prioritized profit maximization over public interest by passively restricting access to public spaces. I will engage further on Solidere’s management of public spaces and its role in neoliberal urbanism when speaking about the controlled city.
In the case of Beirut Central District the commodification not only includes physical property and its design. The master plan also provides for a commodification of cultural heritage. According to Solidere officials it was seen as a useful marketing tool for their project[35]. Being one of the oldest capitals in the world, Beirut’s history could be turned into profit by linking it to the rebuilding of downtown.
Especially the competition to other possible bridgeheads and economic centers in the Gulf Countries made it necessary for Beirut Central District to stand out[36]. The heritage and cultural aspects distinguish Beirut from Gulf cities that were rapidly built into the desert.
The most striking example of the commodification of culture are the souks in Beirut Central District. Centered in the heart of downtown, the souks used to be an integral part of the social fabric of Beirut. The question to what extend the restoration of their former function should play a role in the rebuilding process was intensively debated. Solidere’s interest in attracting high end customers and businesses needed to be combined with the image of a city rich in culture and traditions. The result is a large outdoor mall that barely resembles a traditional souk. Even though the architectonic outlines of the streets are the same, the handcrafters, self-owned shops and street vendors were replaced by international brands. Solidere’s approach towards ‘bringing the charm of traditional souks into the 21st century’[37] created a shopping experience for customers of upper middleclass and upwards that could still be framed as cultural valuable. The Solidere website advertises it as a socially vibrant cultural meeting spot that enhances the economic vitality of the area. Additionally Solidere emphasizes the vast number of archeological findings in downtown. It is the self-proclaimed biggest archeological site in the world[38]. Most of these sites have been discovered during the reconstruction process. And while a majority of them was destroyed for the sake of new buildings, some of them have been relocated or restored and are integrated into Beirut Central District. Solidere assured to keep a certain amount of them intact. But the way they are integrated into the city is set by Solidere itself.
Walking through the streets of Beirut Central District you might find some of the sites locked behind a glass door in the basement of a commercially used building or integrated into the souk shopping mall. The value that Beirut’s heritage provides is de-linked from the city and turned into profit by Solidere.
The souks do not only represent the commercialization of culture but also of social life. With the transformation of the social fabric in downtown to a profit-driven privatized area the interactions between the people are transformed as well. Since personal interaction with vendors and inhabitants vanished through the establishment of large companies with staff instead of shop owners, shopping became the focus of the souk experience as an extension of social life.
The only playground in downtown is privately owned and only accessible for paying customers. Furthermore, the private security routinely asks bicycle drivers to step off their bikes while driving through the district. The sea-side biking area that Solidere created designated as public area is therefore difficult to reach by bike while there is a private bike-rental next to it. On my visits to the biking route I barely saw bikes without the logo of the bike-rental on them. The area can be seen as semi-public because of the restricted access and the clear profit-maximization approach towards it. The security personal occasionally asked people with dogs on the route to leave and asked about my intentions when I entered with a camera.
Figure 3 Beirut Souks Archeological Finds. Solidere (date unknown), Beirut Souks Archeological Finds, Archeology, Accessed: http://www.solidere.com/city-center/history-and-culture/archeology 07.08.2019
Figure 4 Playground in Beirut Downtown March 2019. Ismael Benkrama, 2019
Figure 5 Biking Lane in Beirut Downtown March 2019. Ismael Benkrama, 2019
The management of the bike-lane creates an altered social life that optimizes the experience of paying customers while restricting access to others.
Debord describes the neoliberalization of cities as the colonization of social life. The commodification goes beyond the direct interaction between human and commodity to the point where human life becomes commodified and commodities are now all there is to see[39].
The privatized city creates an environment in which human existence and interaction has to be justified through profit maximization processes. The neoliberal policies and reconstruction approaches excludes a vast amount of people that should have been taken into consideration in the planning of their central district. It commodifies culture and history and de-links it from the city that created it to optimize capital accumulation in a city-enclave with restricted access.
Therefore, I argue that the privatization of Beirut Central District reproduces a form of structural violence that contradicts the image of a bubble of harmonic living and shopping it tries to create.
The controlled city
In his work ‘The Production of Space’ Lefebvre states that space cannot exist outside its socio-economic context. It is the product of human ‘production’ and is therefore always linked to an ideological context[40].
Following this approach, we cannot look at Beirut Central District, and especially at its public spaces, without linking it to the neoliberal ideology that underpins its reconstruction process.
Solidere positions itself as the main provider for public space in Lebanon. The 39 hectares of designated public area in downtown make up for approximately 50 percent of public areas in Beirut. This image of a public, vibrant and green downtown helps in advertising the real estate in Beirut Central District.
As previously mentioned, these areas are rather semi-public due to their profit-orientation and partly restricted access. Open spaces in neoliberal urbanism are rather designed to control public interaction than to provide an opportunity for its free development[41]. Seeing public space as a product of interaction raises the question if a space can even be seen as public a priori or if it is the social interactions that take place determine if it is public later on. For that reason I argue that an area that is designed in an attempt to control social interaction in a way that benefits private interests cannot be seen as purely public.
Heeg describes the management of space in neoliberal city centers as the control of a high value consumption, relaxation and office area for potential customers that excludes undesirable humans and interaction[42] . The exclusion of undesired people works in various ways. There are barely any public sanitary facilities in downtown and the ones that exist are only accessible through the malls. People that did not come to either shop or eat in a restaurant most likely will not notice them. The restaurants that can afford the rent in the area sell food at prices far higher than in the surrounding districts and mobile street food vendors are not allowed. Even though people that are not part of the desired social background are technically able to use the public areas for a walk, the lack of affordable food and services might influence them to choose a different district instead.
Beggars and street vendors are usually frequent in the image of Beirut’s streets, especially in the touristic shopping and nightlife areas of Hamra and Mar Mikhael. Although Beirut Central District attracts as many tourists, none of them can be found here. They are seen as a potential threat to an undisturbed shopping experience and profit.
Another example is the entrance to the public marina in Zaitounay Bay. Private security guards supervise the tourist attraction on the sea side of Beirut Central District. Part of this job is to regularly question the intentions of young Lebanese men that do not seem to fit into the area. Some of those that cannot give a valid reason to be there are asked to leave.
Figure 6 Marina in Downtown Beirut March 2019. Ismael Benkrama, 2019
The apparent racialization of desirability in Beirut Central District aligns with statements made by Angus Gavin the head of Solidere’s Urban Planning division and his colleagues. In their opinion, Lebanese people are foreign to pedestrian culture and do not know how to ‘behave’ in public space[43]. Aside from the racialization of their idea of who belongs in this ‘public’ area and who does not, this approach raises the question what kind of behavior it is that the Lebanese are ‘incapable’ of. People whose appearance gives the impression that they are able to afford the goods, services and the housing prices in downtown are unlikely to be hindered from using the public spaces, regardless of nationality. The racialization of access is rather utilized to justify the access restriction for a sector of Beirut’s inhabitants that intends to use the area without showing the ‘right behavior’ of consumption willingness.
The broken window theory is one of the main ideological underpinnings of neoliberal localization [44]. It is a psycho-social approach to urban policies stating that visible damages on buildings and unwanted social behavior in urban areas reinforced further damages on buildings as well as the imitation of that behavior. Drawing from this this approach, neoliberal urbanism enforces a zero tolerance policy towards anything that does not discernibly align with the desired aesthetics of unhindered consumption.
In the case of Beirut Central District that applies to humans like beggars, vendors and less privileged Lebanese as well as behavior like skateboarding or biking.
The interactions that the public spaces in Beirut Central District create are therefore already limited by the restriction on possible actors. The privatized concept of open space is unable to create truly public spaces because it is driven by profit-maximization interests instead of public interest.
The structural violence of restricted access to city areas and profit interests controlling social interaction through privatized ‘public spaces’ is a necessary aspect of neoliberal urbanism. Even though the initial plan intended Solidere to eventually hand over control over these spaces to the Beirut municipality, none of that has happened. Solidere stated that they would not want someone to manage the public spaces who is ‘not capable’ to maintain them as they are[45]. The neoliberal power-shift from public to private in downtown makes it possible for Solidere to reduce the state to a mere provider of a legal framework, who no longer has the power to intervene in the market logic without its permission.
The segregated city
When I am walking in and out of Beirut Central District it always strikes me how immediately not only the architecture but also the people, shops and cafes change. The area looks and feels as different to its surrounding districts as its inhabitants are.
This effect is quite intentional. In an interview the head of a town planning department at Solidere compared the district to a Club Med: “You go to Turkey and the country is in deep shit but the club is doing well. You know what I am saying? The Beirut Central District could be like that. […] It has its own components [such as] the hotels on the waterfront, the marina etc., that are interesting for a certain sector of the society”[46].
The idea of the segregated city is to create an urban bubble of wealth that can function as a proxy-city to compete with other cities. By de-linking itself from the rest of the city, the central district does not have to deal with the problems of rest Beirut. Instead it creates an enclave for a privileged few which can compete with international cities for skilled labor and foreign investment.
With its two marinas, the glass-fronted office skyscrapers and residential buildings, as well as the luxurious boutiques and restaurants, the area gives the impression of a playground for the super-rich rather than a city center. The contrast between Beirut Central District and the surrounding districts is even more pronounced in that it could play a significant role in the post-war reunification process. With its position between the predominantly Christian East and the Sunni West of the city, downtown could have made a contribution to connecting the formerly separate areas. Instead the remains of the former social fabric were demolished and turned into a de-linked enclave.
Furthermore, the highway axis that has been built at the Martyrs’ Square in eastern downtown reinforces the spatial segregation of the city by having exactly the route of the former Green Line and re-drawing the borders of the districts like a demarcation line. The highway makes a gradual merging of East and West Beirut at that site impossible[47]. Not only does it transform downtown into an encapsulated island, but also a barrier between other parts of the city.
Road infrastructure plays an essential role in the emergence of the segregated city. The whole Beirut Central District is circled by a multi-lane highway that separates downtown from the rest of the city like a physical barrier. There are no natural walking routes that would lead you into Beirut Central District or out because the highway interrupts all of them. One gets the feeling that Downtown is designed to be reached and left exclusively by car, just as if it was not part of the city around it. This feeling is reinforced by the fact that the highway from downtown without detours leads directly to the airport[48].
The cut-off walkways and the difficult access for pedestrians from the surrounding districts through the highway intersection in the city center combined with the direct airport access, show which clientele is desired in Beirut Central District. With the infrastructure around the area, rich international tourists, professionals and business people can reach Beirut Central District without entering the rest of the city, while excluding residents of neighboring districts.
Additionally to the infrastructure around Beirut Central District, the architecture inside enforces the seclusion as well. Office rents start at more than 300 dollar per square meter[49], a price that is only affordable for big brands and companies. Furthermore, Solidere built predominantly offices and business space in a size that are neither affordable nor profitable for smaller mid-tier merchants[50]. The segregation of shopkeepers is an intended result of the applied broken window theory on Beirut Central District. Solidere does not consider them as compatible with the wanted aesthetic.
“It is chaos. No. We cannot go back to that… We have no room for that. We want the professionals”[51].
The high renting prices apply to living spaces as well. Many of the apartments sold, remain uninhabited and only serve as speculations. The inflated rents ensure that only a small elite can afford living in downtown.
The segregated city functions in three ways. Its infrastructure physically detaches it from the rest of the city and its inhabitants. It creates a city within a city that has no organic connections to its surrounding. Furthermore, the high rents and the lack of small rooms for rent exclude mid-tier merchants and shops from entering into the bubble. This also applies to tenants that must be able to afford rents way above the Lebanese average.
The securitized city
In his work ‘Space politics and the political’ Dikec describes securitization as the necessary link between political ideology and space. It is “an attempt to make the political order neatly correspond with the spatial order”.
Following this approach, the nature of securitization depends on the political ideology that is to be implemented.
I have already mentioned the role of private security forces in the control of public spaces and access to Beirut Central District. The neoliberal idea, that the market needs a framework to function smoothly, manifests itself in a security approach that excludes non-exploitable system components. Lift-arms and guards in downtown control whether humans fit into the desired image and intervene if necessary to restrict access to undesired people.
A look at the map of the visible security mechanisms in Beirut shows that downtown is among the most securitized areas in the city. The security measures go far beyond a few guards at the entrances. The permanent presence of tanks, military vehicles and the army in downtown raises the question on why it is this specific area that needs such extensive protection. From the long list of attacks in Beirut since 2004, only one took place in downtown. Furthermore, almost all attacks were carried out by car bombs, a tactic that could not be prevented by mere military presence and tanks. Neither could the deployed security measures protect the dwellers from the threat of a regional war, like the Israeli bombardment of Beirut in 2006 that flattened entire neighborhoods and displaced millions of people[52].
The neoliberalization of the city is accompanied by a privatization of the understanding of security. In his work on city-securitization in the post 9/11 era, Marcuse identifies the objectives of security measures in cities as shifting from actual safety to a respond to constructed and perceived threats to economic interests and powerful social groups[53]. With his approach, it is possible to draw a link between securitization in downtown and neoliberal urbanism. If we think of a smooth profit maximization process as the fundamental interest of neoliberal urbanism, the securitization of downtown would serve in the first instance the defense against threats to that.
The visibly placed security mechanisms create the illusion of security for the people of Beirut Central District. When customers feel safe in downtown, they are more likely to spend a longer time and more money there. In their study on urban securitization in Beirut Fawaz et al state that in the shopping and banking areas of downtown the security mechanisms differ to those in the office and living area as well as to those on the periphery of the district. The security in the former relies more on discrete forms like concrete blocks, surveillance cameras and metal detectors. These measures do not distract customers from shopping while still providing a sense of security[54]. The choice of security mechanisms therefore follows a pattern that is at least partly driven by profit maximization interests.
In addition to an enhanced feeling of security for potential customers and dwellers, the visible security forces also modify the daily practices of people. The mere presence of them leads people to self-discipline in order to avoid conflict situations. The function of the security mechanisms as a constant reminder, that all behavior is surveyed, results in an adaption of the behavior that is assumed to be wanted.
Figure 7 Visible Security Mechanisms in Municipal Beirut. Mona Fawaz Et al. 2012, Fawaz, Mona, Et. al. 2012. “Living Beirut’s Security Zones: An Investigation of the Modalities and Practice of Urban Security.” City & Society 24 (2): 173–95.
Undesired behavior in Beirut Central District has been met with excessive force in the past. Protests like the demonstrations in downtown against the Lebanese garbage crisis in 2015 are perceived as a threat to the status quo. So the police and the private security forces frequently shut them down through display of physical violence.
The neoliberalization of Beirut Central District created a security concept that prioritizes a smooth profit maximization. Real security of the inhabitants plays only a minor role. In fact, many of the security measures are wholly inadequate to provide more than an illusion of security, as threats such as attacks or regional wars cannot be prevented with the resources available. Instead, the security forces themselves pose a threat to those whose behavior in the Beirut Central District is undesirable. This manifests itself in the self-disciplining of the people in the sense of desired behavior, the access-restriction to downtown for certain individuals or in physical violence against demonstrators. The securitized city reproduces conflicts through forms of structural and physical violence while applying a security concept that neglects the majority of its inhabitants.
Cultural Violence in the Discourse around Beirut Central District
In 1990, the Taif-Agreement formally ended the Lebanese Civil War with ‘no victor, and no vanquished’. At this point in time the country was without any hegemonic national narrative nor collective identity. Therefore, the rebuilding of Beirut Central District was of high ideological value due to its historic role as a social fabric and its location on the green line that separated Beirut during the war. A fast reconstruction of the area symbolized the end of large scale violence in Beirut and the beginning of a new era of prosperity.
Solidere capitalized on this lack of a national narrative by creating its own discourse around the state of the country and the rebuilding-framework.
Henri Edde, who was in charge of creating the postwar master plan, promised that after the successful reconstruction of Beirut Central District Beirutism will replace Lebanonism, a term that has become synonymous with internal disorder (fitnat dakhiliyyat)[55]. The head of the Council for Development and Reconstruction, Al-Fadel Shallaq, warned that if the center is not rapidly rebuilt, it would represent a center of chaos that could explode any minute[56]. This framing created a dichotomy between chaos (represented by the current state of the country and the civil war) and prosperity and order (represented by the rebuilding process and the remodeling of downtown to an international city). Following this discourse, Solidere and international finance institutions (IFIs) like the World Bank could push for a specific kind of rebuilding that does not orientate itself on the prewar downtown (described by the IFIs as anarchic and inappropriate for the vitality it displayed[57]) but instead follows the international trend of neoliberal urbanism.
Since the 15 years of civil war led the country into political, financial and infrastructural chaos, this discourse was very convincing for a large part of the population. The image of a ‘neutral’ company without political interest that rebuilds the city center and restores prosperity and order helped Solidere to overcome criticism on the plans to privatize the whole area as well as its rebuilding process.
Solider’s framing of the reconstruction through a chaos-order dichotomy reappears frequently. The fact that the rebuilding of the souks left no room for middleclass merchants that formerly shaped them is justified by the potential havoc that their souk-culture could cause. Solidere argues that they would address the customers in Downtown aggressively and hang their goods everywhere. This is contrasted with the supposed order and professionalism of international brands, which Solidere prefers as tenants.
Additionally, the urban plan of Beirut Central District reflects the emphasis on discourse around an ‘orderly district’. It is based on a modernist conception of rationality. Seven of the eleven planning zones were dedicated to a single specific purpose like banking or hotels. Through this framing it was possible to create and justify an urban structure that does not resemble the former role of a social fabric and melting pot but instead ‘radiates’ modernity and order.
To create a discourse around Beirut Central District that is so de-linked from its past, Solidere applied an approach that is best described by Haugbolle as ‘collective amnesia’. Through an orchestrated erasure of Beirut’s recent history from the discourse around the ‘new Beirut’ it could benefit from the absence of a national historiography and ideology that had been agreed upon, and fill that void with its own ideology[58]. Solidere’s slogan ‘Beirut, ancient city for the future’ therefore does not concern itself with the present and recent past of the area but instead emphasizes the need to look forward. Solidere used this approach to advocate to rebuild the Martyr Square in Downtown in a way that benefits their profit-interests instead of the public.
Before becoming part of the demarcation line during the Civil War, Martyr Square was the city’s largest open space. His function as bus and taxi stop as well as the many coffee houses, shops and the red light district made him a popular meeting place for Beirut’s residents of all backgrounds. Furthermore, the Martyr Square has been associated with political protest and social movements in the recent past[59]. This recent past is erased in the framing of the new square. On its website, Solidere mentions the present state of the reconstruction as well as future plans and emphasizes the links to ‘the ancient past’ of the Square. Neither its former function as social hub nor information about its recent past are mentioned on the website[60].
The reconstruction of the square was preceded by an architectural competition encouraging architects around the world to submit propositions for a rebuilding-masterplan. In the criteria that Solidere regarded as relevant for the rebuilding, the social role of Martyr Square was completely left out[61]. The result is that the new square hardly plays any role in the life of most people in Beirut. The size of the usable area shrinked notably due to the large parking lot that has been created on the square. Instead of the coffee houses and merchants, the square is now surrounded by a high end residential area, pricy café brands and banks. There are barely any people left that hang around on the square and if so then mostly on their way to or from the Mohammad Al-Amin Mosque next to it.
The slogan ‘Beirut, ancient city for the future’ served more than the purpose to de-link the rebuilding from the recent past and fill the ideological gap. It also allowed Solidere to link the district to a history that it could turn into profit. In the attempt to create a city center that can attract big businesses and high skilled labor and serve as a bridgehead for foreign capital in this area, Beirut Central District competes with other regional metropolises from the Gulf States. In this competition the ancient history and tradition of Beirut are emphasized to distinguish itself from the relatively new cities built by the Petrodollar.
Figure 8 Martyrs Square in the ‘60s. Nancy Wong (date unknown), Personal Collections of Nancy Wong
Figure 9 Martyrs Square in Beirut Downtown March 2019, Ismael Benkrama, 2019
Figure 10 Martyrs Square in Beirut Downtown March 2019. Ismael Benkrama, 2019
As I mentioned, this ‘traditional Downtown’ is a mere show to cover up the neoliberal restructuring and advertise it internationally as an organic part of a living, ancient history.
Michael Sorkin described neoliberal downtowns that create a discursive illusion of tradition as a marketing tool as a city of simulations, television city, the city as theme park. This is nowhere more visible than in its architecture, in buildings that rely for their authority on images drawn from history, from a spuriously appropriated past that substitutes for a more exigent and examined present[…]The architecture of this city is almost purely semiotic, playing the game of grafted signification, theme-park building. Whether it represents generic historicity or generic modernity, such design is based in the same calculus as advertising, the idea of pure imageability, oblivious to the real needs and traditions of those who inhabit it[62].
This is also true in the case of Beirut Central District. The reference back to an ancient past in combination with a promise of modernity cover a present that passes the needs of most inhabitants. This is reflected in the exaggerated presentation of archaeological sites in the area. For this, Solidere, in collaboration with the Ministry of Culture, has designed a ‘heritage trail’ to show visitors the entirety of the preserved history in a tour through downtown. Even though Solidere already advertises for the trail[63] it is not completed so far. The trail attempts to connect the sites that are distributed all over the area to a coherent whole. But the absence of information boards and the arbitrary arrangement, which links sites from different millennia without further contextualization in a trail, rather gives the impression that they are merely trying to point out their existence instead of interweaving them into the city.
In 1994 Solidere published an advertisement video named ‘Beirut. Ancient city of the future’. Conceptualized like a documentary, it tried to set Solidere’s narrative of the Beirut Central District as the main discourse around its reconstruction. The story told by the video reflects the aforementioned amnesia approach. The civil war is not really mentioned and is merely described as a ‘disintegration’. Instead, the narrator emphasizes right from the beginning that Beirut is undergoing a process of renewal, leaving the destruction behind.
In the following, the video describes the role of Downtown in Beirut. While the social aspects are being ignored, the rapid access to the airport, the possibilities for international business, the big harbor and the traditional role as a banking district are mentioned. Thereby, Solidere gives itself a historic justification for a neoliberal rebuilding of the area by framing the past in a way that aligns with its future plans.
The video also picks up the order-chaos discourse. In this case, the urban planning approach Beirut had before the war is described as an ‘agent of destruction’. The omnipresent chaos that Solidere attested to Beirut is framed as a direct consequence of this planning. In addition, the video states that the lack of proper urban planning in the 1960s and 1970s is responsible for the disappearance of Beirut’s cultural and architectural past. This almost cynical statement presents Solidere’s ‘orderly’ urban planning approach as a solution to the decline of Beirut’s historic architecture. Thereby, it ignores that almost all of the area’s former buildings were demolished by Solidere, just to be replaced by modern buildings, inspired by international criteria for neoliberal urbanism instead of the city’s history.
Solidere tries to refute the criticism of the reconstruction plan that a bubble for the wealthy is being created. While the video speaks about ‘the inhabitants of Downtown’, scenes of working class people in traditional clothing are shown. It is also alleged that residents could have prevent the demolition of their buildings just by renovating them (even with Solidere’s help). However, the video does not mention the high rents nor the rigorous conditions imposed on the renovation, which are impossible to afford by the vast majority of Beirut’s residents. The video concludes that the founding of Solidere was necessary since only they could have built the ‘modern city’ that Beirut’s inhabitants are desiring, while still honoring the city’s ancient history.
The choice of a narrative that locates Beirut in a transition between antiquity and future was made mainly to shape the national discourse around the reconstruction of Beirut Central District. The aim was to justify a reconstruction process that is determent by profit-oriented paradigms and the underrepresentation of the needs of most former inhabitants of downtown. But to become an internationally competitive city and a bridgehead for foreign capital, the city also needs to be framed for an international audience. Swyngedouw et al. write on neoliberal urbanism that: “Repositioning the city on the map of the competitive landscape meant reimagining and recreating urban space, not just in the eyes of the master planners and city fathers and mothers, but primarily for the outsider, the investor, developer, businesswoman or-man, or the money-packed tourist”[64].
Therefore, Solidere adjusted its discourse to advertise its reconstruction program internationally. From the late 1990 on, Beirut Central District was no longer just promoted as an ‘ancient city for the future’ but also as ‘the finest city center in the Middle East’. The brochure that Solidere published in 2004 was addressed at international prospective investors or customers and featured that slogan in the headline. It framed the city as an international hub with a highly educated, young and multi-lingual workforce, an extraordinary financial business environment and high-end residential areas[65].
Following the same discourse, former head of Solidere Saad Hariri marketed Downtown as ‘the Hong Kong of the Mediterranean’ and the new blossoming international center of finance and commerce[66]. And the announcement for the design competition for the Martyr’s Square reconstruction requested participating architects to take inspiration from Berlin’s Potsdamer Platz. Naeff pointed out, that all these advertisement strategies formulate Beirut Central District’s rebuilding in a transnational perspective[67]. In this case I would recommend to distinguish between a national discourse that justifies a reconstruction without taking the needs of many inhabitants into consideration and a transnational discourse that frames Beirut as a neoliberal business center that provides a framework to ensure a smooth accumulation process for international capital.
Solidere influenced the discourse around the reconstruction of Beirut by capitalizing on the lack of a national ideology, the Lebanese people’s desire to leave behind the violence of the civil war and their wish for a fast and non-sectarian rebuilding as well an amnesia approach. The financial means that were invested and Hariri’s influence on national media outlets also played a role in the success of this particular framing of Beirut[68]. The cultural violence of influencing national discourses and to a certain part even what is considered the history of Beirut was utilized to ensure a reconstruction process that aligns with Solidere’s vision of a neoliberal central district. Galtung described cultural violence as a cover up for structural and direct violence. In this part I have shown how Solidere was able to justify a neoliberal reconstruction plan that is inherently violent and excluding by creating a fitting narrative around it.
Conclusion
The example of Beirut shows that urbanism and positive peace are inextricably intertwined.
Through its pursuit to transform Beirut Central District into an entrepreneurial city, Solidere created a downtown that meets all criteria for neoliberal urbanism. The city and its reconstruction have been privatized and reshaped after profit-maximizing paradigms. Thereby, creating a district that prioritizes capital accumulation over social aspects and the needs of most of Beirut’s inhabitants. Downtown is being segregated from its surrounding and de-linked from its history and former function as a social fabric.
By applying Galtung’s theory of peace and conflict I demonstrated how this approach to urbanism is necessarily an obstacle to Positive Peace. The neoliberal policies I discussed in this paper immanently reproduce all forms of violence that Galtung listed in his theorization of conflicts. Structural violence is reproduced through segregation, privatization and control over downtown. The fragmentation, segmentation and marginalization that define structural violence in Galtung’s sense are a necessary result of this profit-oriented city planning.
By securitizing the city and privatizing security mechanisms, this structural violence can also turn into direct violence. Physical repression of unwanted behavior and access-restriction for undesired people are integral parts of neoliberal urbanism and foster direct violence.
By influencing the national discourse on downtown’s rebuilding, Solidere has been able to attribute a story and function to Beirut Central District that matches its vision for the district’s future. As a result, the company was able to justify a reconstruction that prioritizes its own profit maximization objectives over all other aspects that can shape a city. In this case, cultural violence is a necessity in neoliberal urbanism. The goal of creating a framework for smooth capital accumulation requires a discursive approval from society. This approval was fabricated in the case of Beirut Central District through various influences on the national discourse around the reconstruction process. Galtung describes cultural violence as a discursive or ideological concealment of direct and structural violence. Solidere has managed to frame the restructuring of the city according to profit maximization paradigms as necessary modernization and an economical opportunity for the whole country.
The translation of neoliberal ideology into urban space might adapt itself to the individual circumstances of different cities. But the subordinate logic of privatization, securitization, control and segregation are inextricably linked to the need to remain competitive on the global market. The example of Beirut Central District shows us how these policies reproduce structural, cultural and direct violence. Therefore, Positive Peace cannot be reached in a city that is structured by neoliberal ideologies and conflicts will necessarily be reproduced. For a deeper understanding of peace and conflict research, urban policy should therefore be understood as an integral part of this discipline.
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[2] Brenner and Theodore (2002).
[3] Heeg and Rosol (2007).
[4] Brenner and Theodore (2002).
[5] Andraos (2008).
[6] Andraos (2008).
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[8] Galtung (1971).
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[10] Galtung (1971).
[11] Galtung (2007).
[12] Ferdowsi (1981).
[13] Andraos (2008).
[14] Harvey (2005).
[15] Brenner and Theodore (2002).
[16] Brenner and Theodore (2002).
[17] Pinson and Morel Journel (2016).
[18] Pinson and Morel Journel (2016).
[19] Andraos (2008).
[20] Schmid (2006), Heeg and Rosol (2007).
[21] Brenner and Theodore (2002).
[22] Andraos (2008).
[23] Naeff (2018).
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[26] World Bank (1993).
[27] Heeg and Rosol (2007).
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[30] Stewart (1996).
[31] Solidere (2004a).
[32] Solidere (2011).
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[34] Andraos (2008).
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[36] Summer (2006).
[37] Solidere (2009).
[38] Peterson and McDonogh (2012).
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[40] Lefebvre (1992).
[41] Mitchell (2012).
[42] Heeg and Rosol (2007).
[43] Andraos (2008).
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[45] Andraos (2008).
[46] Peterson and McDonogh (2012).
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[49] Makarem (2015).
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[53] MARCUSE (2006).
[54] FAWAZ, HARB, and GHARBIEH (2012).
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[56] Hammoud (1991).
[57] Dar al-Handasah (1991).
[58] Haugbolle (2010).
[59] Andraos (2008).
[60] Solidere (2002b).
[61] Andraos (2008).
[62] Sorkin (1992).
[63] Solidere (2002a).
[64] Swyngedouw, Moulaert, and Rodriguez (2002), Andraos (2008).
[65] Solidere (2004b).
[66] Schmid (2006).
[67] Naeff (2018).
[68] Schmid (2006).
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