Introduction: On the Importance of the Subject
From December 2017 onward, a continuum of uprisings/rebellions altered the political life of the Iranian people in relation to those in power. Confronted with these changes, the radical-revolutionary [1] Left found itself facing a question: how should it relate its theoretical teachings to the reality of these uprisings/rebellions in order to formulate a “revolutionary strategy”? While the uprisings of Dey 1396 (December 2017), Mordad 1397 (August 2018), and Aban 1398 (November 2019) were marked by overt class dimensions—once again placing the lower classes and workers (including, and especially, precarious workers) at the center of popular politics—the protests of Tir 1400 (July 2021, “The Uprising of the Thirsty”) and Ordibehesht 1401 (May 2022, “The Uprising of the Hungry”) highlighted the vector of “national oppression” alongside issues of basic livelihood. Meanwhile, because of the “Girls of Revolution Street” movement, the problem of “sexual/gender oppression” had already been introduced into the public sphere and reached its zenith with the “Zhina Uprising.” Confronted now by these three prominent dimensions of domination (class-based, sexual/gender-based, and national), the question the Left has faced—and still faces—is: how should these be understood within a theoretical framework, and how can a political strategy of struggle be derived from that understanding?
By “strategy,” we mean a plan whose elements are internally coherent, and which—beyond “what is to be done?”—also entails certain critical “what is not to be done?” considerations.
In one sense, the key problem confronting the Left is as follows: can we, on the grounds that the world we live in is dominated by the “capitalist mode of production” and that the foundation of this order rests upon the “contradiction between labor and capital” (the extraction of surplus value through the exploitation of labor power), maintain that all other forms of contradiction and oppression must be related to “class contradiction and oppression” in such a way that they explain how the capitalist logic of exploitation persists? Where, by virtue of the “logic of exploitation,” does the “contradiction between labor and capital” fit into the equation of formulating a revolutionary strategy? More fundamentally, how should we conceive of such a strategy?
Would the simultaneous, equal-level inclusion of “class contradiction,” “sexual/gender contradiction,” “national contradiction,” and “environmental contradiction” bring matters to a satisfactory conclusion? Conversely, does insisting on relating all contradictions and their resultant oppressions to the “class contradiction” through the overarching logic of “exploitation” under the capitalist mode of production limit and render any proposed strategy unacceptable?
Finally, is the question of the “working class’s subjectivity” solely a matter of “critique of political economy” concerning the “mode of production”? Or is the notion of “proletarian orientation” as a defining characteristic of a “communist strategy” also at stake here?
The Geography of the Discussion: From Intersections of Oppression to the Meaning of Labor and Capital
The initial encounter in formulating an effective strategy begins with the question of how a communist approach should represent all existing forms of oppression. The origin of such a topic can be traced back to “Black Feminism” in the United States. From the viewpoint of Black communist and feminist activists, if a socialist revolution is not simultaneously feminist and anti-racist, it cannot ensure universal liberation. Moreover, this was not solely about “women’s rights.” Another vital issue was the struggle against “homophobia,” which introduced the concept of “interwoven systems of oppression” (intersectionality) into the field of discourse. On this basis, the question arises: by what approach can we conceptualize all the oppressed identities accumulated within a single exemplary individual (a Baluch Sunni lesbian worker) and mobilize them under a single political program of struggle?
Today, political tendencies associated with intersectionality often oppose the notion that oppressed identities must be analyzed “in class terms” as elements that increase the “rate of exploitation” and facilitate plunder and dispossession. In their view, there is no priority—neither politically nor ontologically—of any one “contradiction” over others. The crisis that this approach faces as a theoretical formulation is a crisis of “starting point” and “ending point” in the analysis. Has the “capitalist transformation” of the mode of production since the sixteenth century brought about a fundamental difference in the manifestation of various forms of oppression or not?
For example, although “reproductive labor in the home” is not “value-generating” from the standpoint of capital, production would not be possible without it. Thus, a division between the inside and outside of value production is created, linking one fundamental aspect of “gender oppression” (i.e., reproductive labor) to “workplace exploitation” through “the production of surplus value.” Similarly, the creation of “center” and “periphery” zones within a nation’s borders guarantees the “accumulation of capital” through “non-exploitative oppression,” meaning that the mere physical existence of peripheral populations has no value for “national capitalism”—not even as a labor force—and they may be dealt with, as in cases of the genocide of “Native Americans” or “Palestinians,” in a manner that requires no accountability.
This, however, does not create a contradiction in explaining the “logic of exploitation.” As with the discussion on “reproduction through domestic labor,” capitalism perpetually draws a boundary between the inside and outside of “value production.” For example, being “outside of value” can easily be equated with “systematic murder” of those on the periphery. In other words, if you are not “useful” either from a “reproductive” or a strictly “productive” standpoint—in the economic sense—you are evaluated as a “surplus” or even a “threat” to the “logic of production,” someone who can be easily “eliminated.” Hence, for instance, kulbars (cross-border porters), and fuel carriers are considered “detrimental to national production,” and regarded as akin to “homo sacer,” living in a state of “bare life.” Their killing requires no accountability.
Some tendencies on the Left assume that examples like these contradict the “logic of capital,” in which everything should be at the service of “producing surplus value.” From this assumption, they conclude that other forms of contradiction (exemplified in cases such as “reproductive labor in the home,” “national oppression,” “religious oppression,” and so forth) enjoy independence from the “class contradiction.” Hence, they believe the solution lies in understanding all contradictions as existing on the same level. Clear instances of this perspective can be found at home as well: the Islamic Republic’s religious policies toward women are essentially interpreted by this segment of the Left as an anti-capitalist approach that clearly runs counter to the logic of extracting surplus value. Yet this is only the appearance of the matter, since the subject still follows that same formula of “inside/outside the sphere of value production.”
Extensive exclusion of women from the labor market, or the numerous prohibitions against their presence in workplaces without hijab, are two examples that can be readily explained by that very formula. While in the first case, “exclusion” can easily be linked to the “necessity of reproduction,” the second case (making it difficult for women to be present in the workplace) signals a mechanism serving on the one hand to “discipline” the workforce, and on the other, to “cheapen” it. The question of why this process is often channeled through “Islamic ideology” in countries like Iran is a historical and contingent matter. After all, in other parts of the world, various other ideologies are alive and well, standing “outside value production” yet providing service to “value production” within it. For instance, the prohibition of free enterprise in the realm of “prostitution” in countries like Iran is not evidence of Islam’s opposition to capitalism. Rather, it enables the existence of multifarious forms of such enterprise in line with a particular aspect favored by a pre-capitalist ideology: temporary marriage (sigheh). The flexibility of capitalism lies precisely in its refusal to commit to a single, uniform method of value expansion. It strives to convince every manner of prior tradition and culture to bow to the principle of value creation, each in its own fashion.
Nevertheless, standing firmly on the “contradiction between labor and capital” earns a critique from non-Marxist leftists, who argue that this position is necessarily “workerist” and views everything through the narrow lens of “exploitation of the working class” and its relations. From their perspective, it fails to recognize various forms of “extra-economic domination” and thereby cannot include a larger population in the domain of “revolutionary subjectivity.” For example, regarding “national oppression,” despite the explanations given above, it is claimed that what we face is a colonial relationship of center-periphery, and that this situation is pre-capitalist. From this angle, the argument is that keeping nature and labor cheap in the peripheries is primarily the product of a systematic mechanism of indigenous dispossession from their land and nature, not the mechanism of capital accumulation via labor exploitation.
This formulation, however, can be easily challenged by asking: wasn’t the most fundamental mechanism of the so-called “primitive accumulation of capital” precisely this “dispossession”? And doesn’t the repeated occurrence of this “dispossession” after the “primitive” phase, embedded in the logic of capital (the mechanism of reproduction), continue to take place? Neglecting the boundary that capital draws between “inside and outside value production” leads to such errors: it fails to grasp that the “outside of value production” effectively constitutes the “conditions of possibility” for producing value.
Let’s consider the example of oppression against the LGBTQIA+ community. It is often assumed that sexual-gender oppression fundamentally has no relation to the “logic of capital,” and that in countries like Iran, the issue is simply about these individuals’ “survival” in the face of “religious fanaticism.” In such a framing, there is essentially no recognition of how the liberation and visibility of queer people undermine the foundations of the “binary patriarchal family” (the man-woman family structure with male dominance) on the one hand, and the “heteronormative” order on the other—both of which uphold the maintenance and transmission of “private property,” which in our era is fully “capitalist.” In places where “homosexuality” is acknowledged as a result of the legitimate civil struggles of homosexual individuals, the system strives to incorporate them into realms such as the “media industry,” the “pornography industry,” or the “legalization of same-sex marriage” (another way of forming a legally recognized family, albeit a modern one!). In fact, by distorting their essence and goals, it seizes their struggles and turns them against themselves.
In any case, when we speak of the “contradiction between labor and capital,” it does not mean that in every instance of oppression we must seek out some “working-class” angle to make it fit into a “labor and capital” analysis. Consider the example of the “genocide of Palestinians” currently being carried out with unprecedented brutality: everything may appear as if it belongs to a pre-capitalist colonial scenario in which a land is forcibly seized and its indigenous inhabitants are massacred or displaced. One might assume that if any part of the situation had something to do with class relations, then at the very least the Israelis would put all those displaced and jobless Palestinians to work as “free” (even enslaved) labor. But they are engaged in a process of ethnic cleansing, seemingly backed by the ideological support of Zionism. So what is really going on?
What’s happening is that in Palestine, an extensive dispossession has been ongoing in the course of “global capital accumulation” for over 70 years, and the killing of Palestinians is partly due to their resistance to this “dispossession.” This is the same principle that has held true since the era of “so-called primitive accumulation,” wherever it has occurred: any resistance to it, then as now, is met with the harshest of responses. The fact that “dispossession” continues after the “primitive” phase, now nested within the logic of “capitalist reproduction,” does not mean the machinery of violence has been dismantled. Rather, it means that “legal and economic mechanisms” play more prominent roles than before. Even in the case of “genocide,” if we look closely, we see that the killings are carried out in just the right measure to keep “Palestinians” as a constitutive exception that upholds the “state of exception” in the Middle East—ensuring the ongoing circulation of arms profits and the survival of imperialist geopolitics in the region.
Despite all these clarifications, it seems we live in an era where we must once again ask: what use is “Marxism” for analyzing the current situation and designing a strategy to fight against it? In other words, our back-and-forth between reality and Marxist teachings is not intended to justify Marxism or dogmatically adjust reality to it; rather, these are the questions we face in confronting reality and the barriers to struggle that lead us to Marxist teachings in search of illuminating answers. Particularly, we ask: if the “logic of capital” is merely one logic of domination among others, and not the “super-logic” of our time, then wouldn’t a “strategy of everyone together against all forms of domination” have been readily available since the dawn of human history?
At this point, a serious methodological issue arises: Why must the understanding of “capital” at a “logical” level be distinguished from the understanding of “capitalism” at a “historical” level? What political significance, aside from theoretical accomplishments, does it have at the level of logical abstraction to assume a scenario in which capital encounters no obstacles and smoothly extracts surplus value from supposedly “free” labor-power? Is it conceivable to imagine a capitalism that would favor abolishing “national oppression” and “sexual/gender oppression”? How should we infer “contradiction” within such a mode of production? What is the relationship between the historical situation and the pure logic? Does the historical situation contradict the political strategies derived from the logical one?
In what follows, we will attempt to formulate an alternative perspective on this disputed issue, based on the groundwork laid out so far.
The Methodological Issue
Establishing the relationship between class contradiction and other forms of oppression is impossible without clarifying methodological foundations—i.e., without recognizing distinct levels of analysis and the corresponding ontological, epistemological, and methodological distinctions between these levels (logical abstraction, the intermediate level, and the historical level). We believe that only such a point of departure can provide us with the tools to, at the level of logical abstraction, demonstrate why and in what sense one contradiction is primary and another secondary, and then, at the historical level, to explain the relationship between contradictions and the question of the revolutionary subject, organization, and political power. For if remaining solely at the level of logical abstraction and neglecting the historical dimension of phenomena precludes any material impact on current reality, then limiting ourselves to the historical level while ignoring the importance of logical abstraction results in a prison of sheer empiricism—one that, by shutting down dialectical thought and understanding of phenomena, makes any rational conception and creation of the new impossible. Thus, methodological confusion and failure to recognize distinct levels of analysis carry serious theoretical and political consequences, which we will detail further.
When we apply the theoretical necessities of value theory derived from the level of logical abstraction directly and without mediation to the historical level, we fall into economism. Conversely, when we treat value theory as a free-floating expression of historical struggles, we slip into voluntarism. Escaping the problem of economism and voluntarism, along with their reductionist and essentialist implications, requires that we distinguish between different levels of analysis.
Not only do we need to explain the necessary relations of the logic of capital, we also need mediations that facilitate our transition from the logical level to the intermediate and historical levels. At the level of logical abstraction, we can speak of the “necessary” or dialectical relations of capital in a purely capitalist society. At the intermediate level, however, capital’s dominance is never absolute; the accumulation of capital and the reproduction of social life require political, ideological, legal, and juridical supports. As a result, at the intermediate level, the iron necessity of capital is modified by historical contingencies, and we encounter distinct periods in the historical life of capital. Finally, at the historical level, when we examine specific accumulation strategies and structures in a given country, we recognize that alongside the agency of capital, there are political, ideological, legal, and juridical practices that can operate relatively independently of capital’s economic logic. Therefore, as we move from the logical to the historical level of analysis, we move from the abstract to the concrete and, simultaneously, from the structural to the realm of agency.
In this approach, understanding capital at the level of logical abstraction provides a touchstone that allows us to distinguish “capitalism” from “non-capitalism” and to grasp the inner logic of capital as the inner core of all existing capitalist societies. At this level of understanding, we face a pure capitalist society in which the capitalist commodity-based economic logic governs all aspects of social life and its reproduction. A common objection to this depiction of a purely capitalist society is that it is “one-sided.” But this “one-sidedness” stems from the abstract logic of value’s self-expansion, and theory simply provides an opportunity for capital’s own story to be revealed. It is for this reason that issues like domestic labor or biological reproduction are excluded from pure theory of capitalism. This exclusion in no way implies that these issues are unimportant; rather, it means that they must be conceptualized at the intermediate and historical levels of analysis. At the same time, having a clear and coherent understanding of capital’s inner logic at the level of abstraction is a prerequisite for understanding how this logic is later articulated with other dimensions of social life (the state, sexual-gender relations, environmental relations, religion, etc.). Hence the main question is not whether issues like gender should be explained within political economy, but rather at which level of analysis they should be introduced.
For this reason, at the level of logical abstraction, capital is indifferent to race, nationality, and gender, and its ontological existence is not inherently tied to these forms of oppression. At the intermediate level, however, capital’s dominance is never absolute, and in every historical period of capitalism, the logic of capital has relied on its ideological, political, and juridical arms to reproduce social life. Thus, it has harnessed a range of unequal relations (gender-based, national, religious, racial, and so forth) to serve its value-expanding ends. In other words, at the historical level, alongside capital’s causality, other mechanisms of domination also operate with relative autonomy in producing and reproducing the status quo.
Relying on this methodological approach, we can conclude that at the level of logical abstraction, class contradiction possesses an ontological priority over other contradictions. However, this ontological priority has serious historical and political implications: it implies that struggles against unequal relations and various existing forms of oppression may achieve coexistence between parties involved but still leave the underlying logic of the situation intact. This, in turn, poses a serious challenge to defining a revolutionary strategy—an issue we can now examine with greater precision.
Which Principal Contradiction? Which Revolutionary Strategy?
Examining and reflecting on the differences, divergences, debates, and at times even ideological conflicts among various radical-revolutionary Left tendencies (both internationally in general and specifically within Iran’s political sphere) over the fundamental question of the “contradiction” and the classic “primary-secondary” division leads us, at this juncture, to the conclusion that in the overwhelming majority of these positions, we face a profound and common crisis. For the sake of opening the discussion, we might give a brief name and formulation to this crisis: a lack of an objective, timely, and materially realizable concern in confronting the crisis of “strategy” (inseparably linked to the three issues of the “revolutionary subject,” “organization,” and “political power”).
To establish a bridge between this general diagnosis and the explanation of our own affirmative and strategic approach to the matter of “contradictions,” we find it necessary, first, to adopt a negative lens. We will summarize the orientations of the aforementioned tendencies and the identifiable shortcomings therein into two broad categories (with the emphasis that the currents within each category do not necessarily agree or align with one another in all respects):
Workerist Tendencies: These tendencies often engage in an exaggerated and at times idealistic simplification of the question of class unity. This stems from either neglecting or downplaying the active mechanisms of other contradictions and the concrete impact they have on achieving that “promised unity.” As a result, they fail to define a practical strategy that would effectively confront the specific characteristics of each of these contradictions to realize any form of victorious solidarity. The consequence of this approach is falling into a sterile dogmatism that assesses situations solely through a static and reductionist interpretation of the “doctrine” of the labor-capital contradiction’s primacy. Consequently, it regards all other contradictions as “false,” thus forgoing a proactive, creative, and organized engagement with the obstacles and complexities of each circumstance—engagement that would require dynamism in theoretical teachings at every stage of strategic advance toward the goal. This approach constructs a utopian image of revolution and communist society, as if all forms of oppression and inequality-producing contradictions will miraculously and spontaneously vanish on their own. It therefore ignores the preconditions necessary for realizing this ideal—conditions that must be worked on starting now, at the ideological and organizational level, by forging a material and structured link between different contradictions and the systems of oppression they sustain.
Tendencies That Equate All Contradictions (including the dominant currents attributed to intersectionality, as well as other approaches closely or somewhat aligned with them) : Paradoxically, despite claiming to critique economism in opposing workerist tendencies, these currents fall into an economistic understanding of class contradiction. This manifests as a (sometimes strong) rejection of any notion or interpretation of “primacy” or “fundamentality” of this contradiction. They show no concern for “victorious” forms of organization and, as a result, fail to squarely confront the determining question of strategy. Instead, they exhibit a kind of logical misdirection that confuses the decisive distinctions between strategy and tactics. The outcome is a lapse into a sterile dogmatism that assesses issues solely on the basis of a “doctrine” of equal-value distribution among various contradictions and oppressions. By implicitly conflating “contradiction” and “oppression,” they interpret attaching the adjective “primary” to class contradiction as a belittling of other forms of “oppression.” In doing so, they miss the chance to identify and concretely evaluate a tangible “enemy” that can be targeted. As a result of this approach, the search for and creation of material tools to shatter that “enemy”—and the critical question of “political power”—are, at best, relegated to secondary, vague, or indefinitely postponable matters. In many cases, they are simply abandoned altogether.
It appears that what effectively exempts both opposing sides of this current crisis from striving to define or redefine a victorious strategy is, first and foremost, the absolute absence of any practical belief in the possibility of victory and the refining of a will directed toward it. Put more plainly, the situation we inhabit shapes a particular kind of subjectivity among radical-revolutionary left forces—one that does not embody its relationship with objective conditions in a dialectical movement between “what is” and “what ought to be.” Instead, this subjectivity, under the yoke of objective conditions, remains confined entirely within the realm of “what is,” reducing its given and inevitable task to nothing more than “what can be done in ideological harmony with the doctrine.”
Such subjectivity, imprisoned within the cage of objectivity, begins its effort to define its own tasks of struggle solely from the realm of genuinely existing possibilities observed through the lens of doctrine. Inevitably, then, it can imagine no horizon of victory. Consequently, any attempt to materially construct an organized will oriented toward victory is deemed untimely. It absolves itself historically from confronting the strategic problem as a crisis—either by deeming this task completely irrelevant (and in some cases even harmful and contradictory to the principle of equality!) or by delegating it to future generations of fighters (in some vague and indeterminate future) in the hope that they might struggle under more favorable objective conditions for victory. Alternatively, it treats the prescriptions of historical strategic texts as “eternal and everlasting strategies” and waits for circumstances that deserve and are prepared to implement them.
Under these conditions, the issue of the relationship between various “contradictions” and the existing disagreements over them is reduced to a clash between different doctrines (sociological, economic, political, philosophical, anthropological, ethnographic, etc.). Certainly, these debates are sometimes accompanied by concrete examples and documented facts in current analyses. Without doubt, for any fighting force or organization, the confrontation of theories, arguments, and examples is not only instructive but also a necessary condition for understanding the different and sometimes contradictory facets of the matter.
Thus, our intention here is not to downplay or dismiss the importance of these debates, but rather to highlight a disruptive absence: the absence of a strategic perspective that would enable the formulation of any organized program to sketch out a horizon and move concretely toward victory—based on a strategic understanding of the role, position, and interrelation of different “contradictions” and the subjects that bear them. The consequences of this absence of strategy in the practical struggle of the tendencies under discussion generally manifest in two broad forms:
A Tendency that, by recognizing class contradiction as the “primary Contradiction,” considers other contradictions less important and sometimes even entirely spurious and deceptive: According to this view, the influence of various contradictions—sexual/gender-based, national, environmental, and so forth—on the course of class struggle is reduced, to varying degrees and forms, to the “lack of class consciousness” or the infiltration of “deviant tendencies” among workers, which is seen as an obstacle to acquiring or elevating this consciousness. As a result of this diagnosis and framing of the fundamental crisis in proletarian struggles, the scope of militant directives largely narrows down to propaganda and advocacy aimed at increasing class consciousness among the working forces. At times, these directives may also include supportive interventions in workers’ economic struggles, considered as a potential ground for nurturing such class consciousness. Put simply, we might say that the (spoken or unspoken) presupposition of this approach to the “contradictions” and the crises they generate is that under current conditions, the desired level of class consciousness necessary for defining a victorious proletarian strategy does not yet exist. However—citing doctrine—it will inevitably arrive at some point in the future. At that time, the enhanced consciousness of the workforce, and their transformation into a class-for-itself, will neutralize the disruptive effects of other contradictions. Consequently, a unified class, freed from its false internal contradictions, can march triumphantly toward the final confrontation.
A Tendency that rejects any division of contradictions into “primary and secondary” and emphasizes their equivalence in emancipatory struggles: The starting point of this approach to contradictions shares a common assumption with the previous tendency, though it ultimately arrives at an opposite conclusion: since categorizing contradictions as “primary-secondary” implies “important and fundamental” versus “less important, secondary, or even false,” we must break radically with this division in order to place the struggle against all forms of “oppression” and discrimination on an equal footing (whether pursued independently or simultaneously). While this second tendency does pay attention to the particular features of each type of contradiction and the resulting forms of oppression, it often overlooks—or approaches only vaguely—a decisive factor at the strategic level. As we noted briefly before, this factor is the act of concretely naming the enemy within a given general order, targeting it as a materially identifiable force at each stage of struggle, and providing the necessary tools and means to strike and bring it down (we will address this point more clearly later). This absence has tangible consequences in the practical activity of this second tendency, which manifest—either partially or simultaneously—in the various currents attributed to it. These include: reducing emancipatory struggle to everyday individual and collective resistance; turning organizations into small groups and collectives loyal to a doctrine, promoting forms of practical solidarity only within a narrow, limited sphere; a prominence of the academic, theoretical, and media-driven aspects of disputes over their political-organizational facets; and stagnation in a kind of repetitive movementism lacking sustainable, material advancements.
However, in order for the negative aspect of our analysis to lead to the formulation of a reasoned, affirmative position regarding the categorization of “contradictions”—a position that can provide the conditions necessary for defining strategy—we must also responsibly avoid caricaturing the tendencies we are criticizing. Thus, we consider it our duty, while emphasizing that each side of this dispute contains certain elements of truth and that the forms of militant activity pursued by each have their importance and utility, to nonetheless articulate our points of divergence or differing conclusions. Only by doing so can we logically counter their shortcomings and thereby define and refine our own affirmative stance.
1- The Current situation (objective conditions): Despite the emergence and manifestation of various progressive uprisings in Iran and other countries around the world, the current conditions are not hopeful and do not inherently provide a prospect for the victory of emancipatory struggles. On the contrary, the repeated and largely similar failures of mass uprisings in recent years indicate the objective and subjective incapacity of these movements to advance toward their goals and ideals. By coincidence, the objective confrontation with the existing situation speaks to the retrogressive, step-by-step advancement of the most reactionary forces and currents. The rise of fascist and pseudo-fascist tendencies, the enactment of laws, and the implementation of classic right-wing extremist policies by regimes protecting capitalist interests in many countries (regardless of whether the ruling parties are typically categorized as right-wing extremists) clearly attest to the validity of this claim. Evidences of this can be seen not only within the ruling political system of Iran but also in significant portions of the Iranian opposition, which generally enjoy systematic financial and political support from imperialist institutions and states. Therefore, deeming the objective conditions unfavorable is by no means devoid of truth, and our use of the term “subjectivity imprisoned within the cage of objectivity” should not be interpreted as a denial of these objective characteristics of the situation. We do not begin our analysis from a parallel or dreamlike world detached from existing reality, which would replace the effort to create the real and material possibility of victory with a mirage of the promised triumph. On the contrary, we contend that the dissatisfaction with the current conditions has placed us more than ever at the crossroads of “socialism or barbarism.” In facing this dilemma, one cannot modestly remain confined within the framework of objective conditions and limit the definition of militant action solely to responding to the question “what can be done?” Doing so would mean that the historical horizon and the real consequences of this approach amount to nothing but the inevitable acceptance of barbarian victory (accepted in practice, not necessarily in discourse), the reliance on limited resistances, and, at best, the creation of temporary slowdowns in their rise. The harms of this subjectivity confined within the confrontation with current conditions manifest in various ways: a form of messianism that merely waits for favorable objective conditions to keep the flame alive through a pseudo-moral loyalty to ideals; a type of exaggerated agitation and mesmerization during mass uprisings, which manifests in various forms of unplanned overactivity; the shift of this agitation and lack of planning after the subsiding or failure of uprisings into a nostalgic, non-harmful, and possibly fanatic complacency, or a form of utter despair and passivity; resorting to repeatedly tested and failed versions such as attempting some form of convergence around a social-democratic platform to combat the rise of fascism, etc. All these instances more or less attest to a pervasive confusion and the absence of a viable strategic horizon. However, we believe that the urgency of confronting the dilemma of “socialism or barbarism” necessitates departing from the question “what can be done?” (and its related question: “what should not be done?”) to define a victorious strategy. From this perspective, the effort to provide effective and progressive militant tools and methods within the scope of existing or creatable objective possibilities (“what can be done?”) must be subordinate to a strategic response to the question “what should be done?”[2] In this regard, it is essential to ruthlessly and impartially confront and challenge the flaws, inadequacies, and ambiguities that hinder the movement toward defining a victorious strategy, while maintaining an unassailable loyalty to fundamental ideals and principles. In the continuation, we will demonstrate that one of these ambiguities is the decisive issue of determining the relationship among contradictions and categorizing them as “primary” and “secondary.”
2- Our Experiences and observations indicate that “class consciousness” among the subjugated/exploited subjects sppears highly fragile in the present conditions: Despite evidence of the development or potential development of this consciousness at certain points in recent struggles, especially since December 2017, this process has consistently been fragmented and cyclical. In areas where the growth of this consciousness has gained more solidity and achieved a form of affirmative political expression, its dissemination and spread to other sectors have not exhibited a stable and consolidated character. Simultaneously, the infiltration of deviant and reactionary tendencies and their destructive impact on the formation and growth of this consciousness is not a new phenomenon that can be denied. Therefore, pursuing propaganda and advocacy policies and making “targeted” interventions in workers’ economic struggles is not only beneficial but also an undeniable necessity for aiding the development of class consciousness and combating “deviant and reactionary tendencies” that serve the interests of the class enemy. However, the problem arises when we are compelled to explicitly define our understanding of “targetedness” and identify “deviant and reactionary tendencies.” From our perspective, the “targetedness” of methods and militant interventions can only be assessed within the framework of a strategic insight and the resultant directives within a revolutionary organization. These insights and directives must be affirmative, dynamic, and progressive in confronting the obstacles and possibilities of changing conditions, allowing for tracking, evaluation, and revision. According to this viewpoint, the “targetedness” of a political decision or action cannot be reduced to its formal alignment with ideals, aspirations, and fundamental principles. Otherwise, no progressive political activist or group and organization would engage in any level of action out of mere pleasure or to pass the time. Instead, they would perceive such actions as aligned with the aspirations that are the ultimate cause of their struggle. Moreover, labeling tendencies present within the ranks of the oppressed subjects as deviant and reactionary cannot and should not be done indiscriminately and without differentiating the presence of identity themes in their demands and conflicts. Certainly, at every stage of struggles, reactionary currents promoting identity-based policies and otherizing seek to intervene to create divisions and fissures within the ranks of the subjects. These currents must be carefully identified and countered with an effective program to repel and isolate them. At the same time, it is necessary to clearly and revolutionarily distinguish between these reactionary currents on one hand and the oppressed identities (whether sexual/gender, national, religious, etc.) on the other, recognizing that their common struggle rightfully serves as an opportunity to highlight specific forms of oppression that have materially subjugated their existence. Acknowledging both the theoretical and practical necessity of combating these specific forms of oppression to achieve liberation and enable the creation and maintenance of their connections, similar to other cases, requires defining a militant strategy that conceptualizes the relationships among various contradictions in a manner that allows its directives to identify and enhance the revolutionary potentials of the subjects bearing these contradictions and organize them for a step-by-step progression toward resolving the issue of “political power.” At the same time, we find it necessary to explicitly delineate our strategic perspective on this sensitive issue by clarifying our boundary with alternative interpretations that equate “abolishing identity-based politics” with the “abolition and eradication of identities.” From our viewpoint, such an understanding is not only non-emancipatory but, with a dangerous slide, can become a lethal threat to the ideal of liberation. We define liberation not as the disappearance and absence of various identity differences (such as cultures, ethnicities, traditions, religions, languages, sexual/gender identities, etc.), which we see as a foundation for their equal, creative, and dynamic coexistence, but rather without any of these identities possessing a specific political legitimacy for organizing collective life (a condition that is the root of separations and othering in various forms of identity-based politics).
3- We also believe that the socialist revolution, and in its process of completion, the abolition of social classes through the eradication of private ownership of the means of production and division of labor (ideological, administrative-executive), and consequently the elimination of systematic exploitation of humans by humans in service of a system based on “surplus value production” (in other words, the realization of a communist social order), will provide the “material possibility” for the eradication of other forms of oppression and discrimination. However, the “realization” of this opened possibility is not conceived as the inherent and inevitable consequence of the entirely coercive process of historical evolution, but rather as a revolutionary project that involves striving to understand and explain the causal and effectual relationships of historical transformations and phenomena in service of creating a rational and organized will to achieve the goal. Just as the emergence and evolution of the capitalist system were not the nullification and absolute end of all ancient traditions and oppressive, alienating relations that preceded it, the dissolution of capitalism and the establishment of a communist political system will also not equate to the inevitable eradication of any form of pre-communist social relations. The essential and determining difference between these two historical transformations lies in the fact that, in the first case (the emergence of capitalism), we have transitioned from one “inherently unequal and alienating social order” to another “inherently unequal and alienating social order,” whose existence and durability are inseparable from the persistence and maintenance of inequality (an inherent trait). In contrast, in the second case, we are transitioning from an “inherently unequal and alienating social order” (capitalism) to another “social order” (communism) in which inequality and alienation are not only not inherent traits and material guarantors of its existence and survival but, moreover, the criterion for measuring and advancing it as a communist order is the success in realizing and establishing free and equal social relations. The material equivalent of this essential difference (as we initially pointed out) is that capitalism, through its inherited mechanisms, systematically places a significant portion of pre-capitalist discriminatory relations and mechanisms in service of a new form of social system based on exploitation, oppression, inequality, and alienation. In contrast, the stabilization and continuation of the communist order do not require the reproduction and maintenance of unequal social relations.[3] However, from this perspective, the undeniable possibility that the communist revolution provides for the eradication of all forms of oppression and inequality arises from the disconnection of the material foundations that systematically and constructively endow these oppressions with their traits within a general social order. But does this necessarily mean the eradication of every form of oppression and inequality in social relations? Our answer to this question is negative. As can be deduced from the arguments above, the non-inherent and non-essential nature of inequality in the ontological definition of a socio-political system does not imply the absence or non-manifestation of incidental inequalities within that system (especially since these inequalities have historical roots and characteristics). Therefore, the revolutionary resolution of class contradiction does not equate to the inevitable and automatic eradication of all forms of oppressive contradictions. Instead, it opens the material possibility for realizing this ideal by dismantling the material foundations that systematically solidify these contradictions and the oppressions based on them. To illustrate our point, consider the example of “patriarchal man” and “capitalism.” These do not constitute a unified social order based on an irreconcilable, singular contradiction (just as, historically, patriarchal man did not emerge with capitalism). However, there is an essential common property between them that allows for the material intermingling and mutual systematic reproduction within a unified socio-political system: namely, the inherent principle of inequality and domination that serves as a shared ontological foundation for the material durability and simultaneity of these two oppressive and discriminatory social orders. In a communist system, this ontological bond is severed, and as a result, the battle against the reproduction of patriarchy and its final eradication is made accessible to communist (feminist-communist) revolutionaries through the representation of the systematic arms and supports that maintain it materially and historically. In other words, the revolutionary resolution of class contradiction (abolition of classes) is not a “sufficient condition” for the eradication of other forms of oppression and inequality that are “necessary conditions” for it. However, this statement itself can lead to another misunderstanding or misinterpretation: that the struggle against other forms of oppression can be postponed until after the socialist revolution and the resolution of class contradiction. We find it necessary to explicitly and decisively oppose such an interpretation: there is no logical and absolute guarantee that a socio-political system built on the ashes of capitalism, despite its lack of necessity and essentiality for historical mechanisms of inequality and oppression, can preemptively block any emergence, manifestation, or reproduction of these oppressions within itself. Achieving this goal is contingent upon realizing the precondition, which, by chance, holds strategic value in the revolutionary organizational process. We explain: From our perspective, the realization of this material possibility, enabled by the abolition of class contradiction (and thus the possibility of abolishing other forms of oppression), necessarily requires that the struggle against various structures of domination and inequality and the identification of the subjugated subjects who bear the interests of this struggle begin today. These subjects must not be treated as secondary or ancillary subjects and programs, but as essential and inseparable components of the communist movement. This theoretical recognition must find its practical materiality in a common militant strategy that can simultaneously and at the core of organizing dismantle “the material foundations of the systematic reproduction of various oppressions, i.e., the class system” (a factor we consider as an essential aspect of the “primary contradiction”), organizing the subjects themselves into an active and continuous struggle to fulfill the other necessary conditions for liberation and the possibility of maintaining their connections. In short, the post-revolutionary order (clearly referring to the communist revolution) can only systematically and materially block the reproduction of various forms of oppression and pave the way for their definitive and final eradication if the revolutionary subjects capable of achieving this goal have identified them in the pre-revolutionary struggle processes and have organically, organizationally, programmatically, and purposefully established connections among them in their militant strategy. This is our understanding of the classical concept of the “all-out revolution.”
4- We are not only aware of the importance of various forms of “everyday resistance,” “environmental-local initiatives to create platforms for dialogue and strengthen solidarity among oppressed subjects,” and “active intervention in uprisings and mass movements with progressive tendencies,” but we also strongly emphasize the necessity of pursuing, expanding, and strengthening these types of militant actions. Simultaneously, we have serious considerations regarding the manner in which these actions are pursued, evaluated, and advanced, which are directly linked to the necessity of strategy in revolutionary struggle. As far as “repetitive activism” and its subjective consequences (a “nostalgic or fanatical complacency” on one hand, and “depressing passivity” on the other) are concerned, we rely on a quote from Alain Badiou that clearly reflects our analysis and stance towards this contemporary tendency: “The truth is that a ‘movement’—as a phenomenon that begins, ends, and likely has slogans—is not equivalent to a ‘politics’ in itself, but rather a historical moment within the realm of politics. However, the modernization and reformation of politics without such historical moments are impossible, as recording politics in history inherently requires collective movements. Nevertheless, not everything historical is political. [A historical moment of a movement can] be regarded as a possible precondition for politics, but it is not inherently constructive of politics. Today, we can summarize [the experiences of recent years’ movements] and say: what is historical can undoubtedly fail due to the lack of politics.” However, the damage observed regarding “everyday resistances” and “environmental-local initiatives” prevalent in current conditions is the persistence and gradual yet unintended transformation of these actions into inherent goals, which render any “outlook for exiting” the established socio-political order implausible and materially inaccessible. In other words, we are confronted with a phenomenon that, based on a deeply internalized (though unacknowledged) belief in the prevailing order, relies solely on marginal alternatives and superficial, temporary tracks to address or challenge this order. This means that, in most cases, we are dealing with forms of closed and alienating subgroups that lack the material capacity to break free from themselves and the ability to advance step by step in a measurable direction toward fundamentally changing the general social order. Undoubtedly, these forms of militant action carry within them the ultimate ideal of a definitive and final exit from this oppressive general order. Moreover, the organizing tendencies within these groups are, in most cases, hopeful that these actions will become interconnected “at a certain time,” “in a certain place,” and “in a certain manner” to realize that ideal. However, we precisely recognize this way of confronting the situation as one of the symptomatic afflictions, which we initially framed as a “lack of an objective, timely, and materially feasible concern in confronting the crisis of strategy.” One of the main causes of this affliction is, indeed, the ambiguity and non-dialectical abstraction in identifying the “enemy.” This is because the strategy of any militant policy begins, above all, with naming, locating, and delineating the boundaries of the “enemy” in order to identify the material tools through which its power and dominance are exercised and to plan for dismantling it. It is obvious that when we speak of an “enemy” in a revolutionary battle, we are referring to an irreconcilable contradiction that does not allow for an equal and non-oppressive relationship between its two opposing sides in any conceivable situation or arena. This strategic aspect transforms the resolution between the concepts of primary and secondary contradictions—relying on the considerations and arguments presented thus far—into an indispensable and imperative necessity. However, it is also necessary here to briefly emphasize a decisive point that may seem obvious at first glance, but failing to articulate it often leads to erroneous interpretations and, at times, to baseless and inconclusive debates. This point is the recognition of a conceptual distinction between “contradiction” and “oppression” despite their tight interconnection. Articulating this distinction is primarily important because it saves revolutionary politics from falling into the trap of a “race” among different forms and degrees of oppression: unjustifiable tolerance of violence, deprivation of legitimate rights, invisibility within a distant power structure, subjugation to another’s desires, or through the servicing of another’s interests, among many other instances—all manifestations of oppression that must be eradicated solely based on their inherently tyrannical nature and without any hierarchical prioritization of necessity and urgency. These manifestations of oppression, however, despite their potential to provide the grounds for the emergence of an emancipatory subjectivity, do not, whether experienced individually or simultaneously, inherently guarantee the formation of such subjectivity. Consequently, they cannot be regarded as a special revolutionary advantage for the “oppressed.” To put it more clearly, “merely perceiving oppression” primarily establishes the position of the “victim.” From this perspective, it is not unfounded that the global hegemonic order in our era readily employs the ideological apparatus of “human rights” to implement its most supremacist and alienating policies. In fact, the dominant order is well aware that depicting “oppressions” and painting a tableau composed of their interconnectedness is one of the effective methods to neutralize the potential agency of the oppressed and to sustain supremacist dominance. However, the concept of “contradiction” comes into play when we understand each unitary reality as a process and each process as a “system based on a set of dualisms”; internal dualisms whose interactions determine the constitution of that unitary process. The direct experience of “oppression” is mediated by the conscious recording within this systematic process of contradictions and the organized pursuit of the practical outcomes of this consciousness, which actualizes its potential agency. Therefore, the human rights approach can aid the system of domination: because this approach, by reducing the “oppressed” to the experience of “oppression,” blocks the mediation of the process of “contradictions” and prevents the actualization of their potential agency by confining it to the role of the “victim.” Secondly, the importance of this conceptual distinction lies in the fact that, in the process of emancipatory struggle, the concept of “contradiction” and its strategic value necessarily do not revolve around the concept of “oppression,” but can instead represent the internal dualisms of a movement from the perspective of its existing political alignments. For example, the “contradiction” between revolutionary orientation and revisionist orientation[4] at certain stages of the struggle can transform into a “strategic contradiction” among the forces within the movement, as it will determine the constitutive process of the movement’s constitution. Thus, it is clear that “oppression” and “contradiction” are not identical concepts, and the use of primary and secondary qualifiers to describe “contradictions” cannot and should not be simply conflated with a hierarchical understanding of “oppressions.” Moreover, the contradictions that constitute a single systematic process are not all of the same nature. These contradictions come in various forms, and their resolution is not achieved through a completely identical path. In this understanding of “types,” a fundamental distinction must be made between irreconcilable contradictions and reconcilable contradictions. This distinction, which was highlighted for its strategic importance in determining the “enemy,” therefore needs to be given more careful and detailed attention and examination. Thus, it is clear that “oppression” and “contradiction” are not identical concepts, and the use of primary and secondary qualifiers to describe “contradictions” cannot and should not be simply conflated with a hierarchical understanding of “oppressions.” Moreover, the contradictions that constitute a single systematic process are not all of the same nature. These contradictions come in various forms, and their resolution is not achieved through a completely identical path. In this understanding of “types,” a fundamental distinction must be made between irreconcilable contradictions and reconcilable contradictions. This distinction, which was highlighted for its strategic importance in determining the “enemy,” therefore needs to be given more careful and detailed attention and examination.
5- The issue is not whether tendencies that equate various contradictions lack opinions or analyses regarding “irreconcilable contradictions” (contradictions based on which an “enemy” can be identified), but rather that such opinions and analyses predominantly remain at the level of abstraction between two orders or systems. At this level of analysis, a facet of truth is observable and verifiable: just as the contradiction between “capitalism/communism” is irreconcilable, contradictions such as “patriarchal man/heteronormativity-feminism,” “chauvinism-nationalism/internationalism,” “racism/brotherhood,” and so forth also possess an irreconcilable nature. This means that both in the realm of logic and in the realm of history, they are absolutely antagonistic. From this perspective, any genuinely egalitarian struggle (under names such as Communism, Feminism, Internationalism, Sisiterhood-Brotherhood[5], etc.) must simultaneously identify capitalism, patriarchal man, heteronormativity, chauvinism, nationalism, racism, and so on as “hostile orders” (enemies) and target them accordingly. If the identification of the enemy were confined to this level of discussion, we could undoubtedly reach an agreement on the equivalence of contradictions. However, disagreement arises when we engage with the strategic level of the issue of “hostility.” Here, the concept of strategy must be reinterpreted by referring to the etymological meaning of the word (its military meaning): a collection of methods, tools, stages, choices, and tactics aimed at striking the enemy and advancing in an evaluable and adjustable direction toward the goal of ultimate victory in battle. From this perspective, the strategic aspect of revolutionary struggle directed toward victory necessitates the integration of “antagonism between two orders” in the form of “antagonism among the subjects bearing the interests of these two orders” and, consequently, the identification and delineation of the material tools for exercising and sustaining the relationship based on domination/exploitation among those subjects. The strategic importance of this aspect of enemy identification is evident in that the organized battle of one order against another can only materialize through the “organization of subjects”; subjects whose material interests are essentially and exclusively dependent on the fundamental deprivation of interests from subjects on the antagonistic front, and there is no conceivable social-political-historical situation in which a sustainable mutual benefit exists between them. Therefore, we must complement the acknowledgment of the irreconcilability of each of the aforementioned contradictions in the preceding lines—which agreed upon an initial understanding of equivalence—with a question regarding their subjects at the strategic level:
We confirm that an irreconcilable contradiction exists between “racism and brotherhood.” Can it be inferred that equal coexistence and sustainable mutual interests among Black, White, Yellow, Hota, Totse, and others are inconceivable in any situation?
We confirm that an irreconcilable contradiction exists between “patriarchal man/heteronormativity and feminism.” Can it be inferred that equal coexistence and sustainable mutual interests among women, men, queer individuals, homosexuals, bisexuals, and others are inconceivable in any situation?
We confirm that an irreconcilable contradiction exists between “chauvinism/nationalism and internationalism.” Can it be inferred that equal coexistence and sustainable mutual interests among Kurds, Turks, Fars, Baloch, Lurs, Arabs, Hota, Totse, and others are inconceivable in any situation?
We confirm that an irreconcilable contradiction exists between “capitalism and communism.” Can it be inferred that equal coexistence and sustainable mutual interests between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are inconceivable in any situation?
By posing simple questions of this kind and responding to them, a distinction emerges that holds an undeniably significant strategic importance. It is clearly evident that the last question has a different and even contradictory answer compared to the other questions: liberation from the capitalist order can only be imagined through affirming the last question; whereas, concerning other orders and the questions arising from them, the notion of liberation is contingent upon a negative response, and by default, any positive answer would lead to the obstruction and negation of the possibility of liberation! More precisely, since the relationship between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is, by definition (in their nature and necessity), an unequal relationship based on domination and exploitation, no form of equal relationship and no stable common interests are conceivable between them under any circumstances. Therefore, liberation from the capitalist order (i.e., resolving the irreconcilable conflict between “capitalism and communism”) is only possible through an irreconcilable struggle between their annexed subjects and the destruction of the bourgeoisie by the organized proletariat (a matter that will inevitably lead to the annihilation of the proletariat itself as a class). In contrast, for example, liberation from the racist order (i.e., resolving the irreconcilable conflict between “racism and solidarity”) not only does not require an irreconcilable struggle between “white and black” or “Hutu and Tutsi” and the mutual annihilation of these identities by each other, but it also depends on providing the material possibility of coexistence free from their oppression with sustainable common interests. The logic embedded in this example can be generalized to other identity-based oppressive orders as well. Because, as mentioned at the end of paragraph 2, “we do not define liberation as the disappearance and absence of various identity differences (various cultures, ethnicities, customs, religions, languages, sexual-gender identities, etc.) which we consider as a basis for their equal, creative, and dialectical coexistence.”
The strategic value of annexing the “enemy order” into the “enemy subject” lies particularly in the fact that it allows us to identify the material tools of their power in specific temporal and spatial spaces and to organize a process to prepare the weapons and means capable of their complete destruction. In the case of capitalism, after identifying the surplus value production system (through the composite path of exploitation, alienation, cheapening, marginalization, etc.) as the “enemy order,”[6] the bourgeoisie can be identified as the “enemy subject,” and the destruction of their material tools of power, namely “private ownership of the means of production,” can be put on the agenda of the struggle.
One of the criticisms that is likely to be raised against this formulation and line of reasoning is that it is based on an inadequate assumption of a formal and abstract separation between “dual” opposing orders. However, given the intertwinement of structures of oppression, the formulation of irreconcilable orders should be freed from these seemingly linear dualisms and depicted and described as intersecting axes. Such a criticism can be illustrated in the diagrams below as the necessity of breaking away from the first form and moving to the second.
(1)
(2)
If the sole objective is the “description” of inter-order conflicts, meaning our understanding of truth is solely based on the alignment between description and the described object, we can acknowledge that the second diagram provides a more faithful representation of the object under study, namely the “irreconcilability among types of orders.” In this way, we also do not settle for the first image at this level, as at the beginning of this section we emphasized the antagonism between any form of revolutionary egalitarianism and all structures of oppression and inequality. However, the problem arises when we understand political truth as the process of creating a new egalitarian order through an organized praxis, that is, where the issue of “organizing and structuring irreconcilable subjects” is seriously raised. The problem with the second diagram is that although it provides a more accurate representation of the inter-order antagonisms at the theoretical level, it so blocks the naming and locating of irreconcilable subjects that the “subject” becomes so fluid and evasive within this circle that organized, continuous, disciplined organization aimed at its practical victory becomes impossible. Let us be clear that our criticism is not about the complexity of the second image compared to the first, since the process of struggle necessarily entails confronting various complexities. Moreover, the issue is not that the emergence and identification of any form of subject in this representation is impossible. Rather, the problem lies in the lack of continuously forming, organizing, and developing characteristics of this subject: that is, the formation of such a subject only occurs within small or temporary groups lacking a specific strategy. In other words, the subject becomes a suspended and rudderless bubble that always floats in the environment of dominant and alienating orders and occasionally bumps into their shores without having the possibility to shift their boundaries. The matter becomes more serious when we see that sometimes such a subject is considered freer and less alienated compared to the organized, institutionalized, and disciplined subject! The reflection of this dilemma in the approaches of the discussed tendencies can be recognized in diagrams such as widespread disorganization (and even, in some cases, anti-organization), the dominance of academia over institutions, a kind of dissolutionist tendency and openness to class mixing, etc.
Another criticism that can be expected to be raised is that, concerning other conflicts (besides class conflict), one can define an irreconcilable conflict among subjects without equating these subjects with the individuals carrying them: specifically, just as the attempt to destroy the “bourgeoisie” (as the enemy subject) in the anti-capitalist struggle does not mean destroying “individuals arising from the bourgeoisie,” one can also identify the “male subject” as the “enemy subject” and aim to destroy it without intending to destroy the “male individual;” or target the “heteronormative subject” as the “enemy subject” without discussing the eradication of the “heterosexual individual;” or label the “white subject” as the “enemy subject” without aiming to destroy white individuals; or direct the struggle towards the destruction of the “Farsi-centric subject” in an irreconcilable conflict without planning the destruction of “individuals belonging to the Farsi nation,” etc.
Instead of seeking to reject this formulation, let us accept it as an “axiom” and question its logical consequence from a strategic perspective: very well, we acknowledge that regarding other irreconcilable conflicts among types of “orders” (first level), we have also managed to transition to the realm of irreconcilable subjects (second level) and have succeeded in identifying the “enemy subjects.” However, let us not forget that the strategic value of this second level of the enemy-determination process naturally emerged at a third level, which we have formulated as: “the possibility of identifying the material tools of the enemy subject’s power in specific temporal and spatial spaces and, consequently, the possibility of producing weapons and means capable of their complete destruction in an organized process.” In this way, we materialized the destruction of the “bourgeois subject” in the destruction of “private ownership of the means of production.” Now the question arises: how can such tangible, targetable, and organizable material entities for their destruction in the struggle against the “male subject,” “heteronormative subject,” “white subject,” “Farsi-centric subject,” etc., be delineated?
Instead of seeking to reject this formulation, let us accept it as an “axiom” and question its logical consequence from a strategic perspective: very well, we acknowledge that regarding other irreconcilable conflicts among types of “orders” (first level), we have also managed to transition to the realm of irreconcilable subjects (second level) and have succeeded in identifying the “enemy subjects.” However, let us not forget that the strategic value of this second level of the enemy-determination process naturally emerged at a third level, which we have formulated as: “the possibility of identifying the material tools of the enemy subject’s power in specific temporal and spatial spaces and, consequently, the possibility of producing weapons and means capable of their complete destruction in an organized process.” In this way, we materialized the destruction of the “bourgeois subject” in the destruction of “private ownership of the means of production.” Now the question arises: how can such tangible, targetable, and organizable material entities for their destruction in the struggle against the “male subject,” “heteronormative subject,” “white subject,” “Farsi-centric subject,” etc., be delineated?
It is evident that in the anti-capitalist struggle, we are dealing with a pervasive antagonism that also targets the moral-religious value system, normative behaviors and habits, the legal and educational systems, etc., within bourgeois society. However, these themes, despite the necessity of ongoing struggle against their manifestations, are not sufficient for defining a strategy; in other words, they do not themselves enable the depiction of a vision for an organized, revolutionary, and forceful exit from the dominant order. Instead, at best, they pave the way for the expansion of everyday individual and collective resistances or a form of radical but permanent demands. Therefore, these legitimate and necessary struggle themes can only be directed towards a definitive exit from the capitalist order if they are interconnected around strategic materiality (the abolition of private ownership of the means of production). Similarly, regarding other antagonistic subjects in the above enemy-raising hypothesis, fighting manifestations such as the moral-religious value system, normative behaviors and habits, the legal and educational systems based on racism, male-patriarchy, chauvinism, nationalism, heteronormativity, etc., is insufficient for defining a strategy and organizing a definitive and revolutionary exit from these structures of oppression. We do not assume that among the tendencies equating the contradictions (at least among their serious forces and perspectives) there is an assertion of the strategic sufficiency of this aspect of struggles. Hence, the search for a kind of materiality in their analyses rightly leads to the highlighting of themes such as “housework,” “reproductive labor,” “colonial center-periphery relations,” “colonial processes of nature destruction,” “disciplining of bodies,” “cheapening of life and time,” “dispossession of indigenous people of land and nature,” “exploitation through linguistic and cultural alienation,” etc. However, presenting these concepts itself initiates the identification of completely obvious and explainable connections with class conflict. Interestingly, the more seriously and deeply the attempts to materialize these analyses are pursued, the more class-oriented the themes and arguments embedded in the analysis become evident; whereas the fundamental claim of the analyses is the absolute equivalence of the contradictions (we identified this contradiction in previous pages as follows: “The paradoxical slipping into an economistic understanding of class conflict despite the claim of the critique of economism in the face of work-oriented tendencies, which leads to the negation (sometimes biased) of any meaning and conception of the ‘essential’ or ‘fundamental’ nature of this conflict.”).
This “movement towards class relations in the process of materializing contradictions” (without reducing other contradictions to class relations or asserting that all originate from class conflict) on one hand, and on the other hand, the “inclusion of the threefold levels of irreconcilable struggle” (irreconcilable conflict of orders / irreconcilable conflict of subjects / organized, targetable material power) are understood by us as the “fundamental” nature of class conflict. According to this interpretation of the concept of “fundamental conflict,” other conflicts and structures of oppression, and the necessity of struggling against them, are neither secondary, deviant, or false, nor do they encompass lesser degrees of oppression, nor are they of less importance and urgency compared to class struggle. The issue is solely about the unique capability of one of these conflicts to define revolutionary strategy and materialize the path out of the dominant order. This capability necessitates the elucidation and refinement of the “proletarian alignment” (in its non-economist and non-work-oriented sense) in organizing struggles.
Thus, the matter is not that class struggle alone is the real struggle and that once this battle is won, other struggles around issues of gender, race, nationality, and environment will automatically triumph by themselves. Rather, the issue is that class conflict is not a conflict among an endless array of contradictions. Class conflict is not an identity among various identities. Class conflict is the fundamental determinant factor of all social identities. Therefore, the main question is always how class conflict permeates various identities from within and imprints itself upon them. The relationship between class conflict and other conflicts is not a bilateral one that results in mutual reinforcement: liberation struggles around identity fissures seek to achieve conditions of equal coexistence, mutual respect, and recognition. However, class struggle is irreconcilable and aims to eliminate classes rather than establish peace and reconciliation between them. This is why the rhetoric of class struggle becomes harmoniously aligned with other social movements in a different manner; it negotiates an irreconcilable conflict with them to overthrow the foundation of the existing order.
Based on these considerations and arguments, our preference and decision will be to use the term “fundamental” instead of “primary” to prevent misunderstandings and erroneous interpretations that describe class conflict as “fundamental” in a superficial or trivial sense, thereby deeming other conflicts as less important.
At the historical level, one can imagine situations where subjects emerging from other contradictions (gender-sexual conflict, national conflict, environmental conflict, etc.) become the vanguard force of this liberating struggle. However, this vanguard quality and position operate in light of the proletarian alignment that has been defined and plays its historical role, not alongside or independently of it. From this perspective, the “primacy” of one or more other contradictions in a supplementary situation does not undermine the “fundamental” nature of class conflict (as defined earlier). In fact, it must be considered that class conflict (as a fundamental contradiction) is a determining principle that governs the mechanisms of action and interaction of diverse liberating struggles. Therefore, while the irreducible multiplicity of these liberating struggles and their synergy must be recognized, on the other hand, the relationship between these liberating struggles and class struggle must be considered. As the class-based essentialism and work-oriented tendencies have revealed their immaturity, this class-based essentialism should not be replaced with other forms of essentialism (by substituting other forms of oppression). Because, as explained, the fundamentality of class conflict arises from its irreconcilable nature, and the subject of our struggle is not the “Olympics of oppressions” and the prioritization among oppressions. This is where analytical weakness leads to strategic and militant weakness, and liberating struggles in the absence of class foundations become weakened, and the existing capitalist order remains untouched. Therefore, the issue of the fundamental conflict versus other oppressive conflicts is directly dependent on the topic of revolutionary strategy and organizing around irreconcilable conflicts. If we accept that capitalism historically advances its value-extracting mechanisms without any specific and fixed temporal and spatial centrality, then there is no fixed temporal and spatial dimension for capitalism, and we cannot speak of a single force at the forefront of the struggle; rather, we are confronted with a proliferation of vanguard forces that temporarily take the lead in the liberating struggle. The revolutionary strategy of these diverse forces will only be successful if they can organize around the class foundation, become united, and take steps to build an alternative society against exploitation, domination, oppression, and alienation. The practical implementation of this approach—the proletarian policy and alignment in various and changing arenas, stages, and conditions of struggle—is the crucial and fundamental task of every revolutionary organization.
References and footnotes
[1] Our deliberate use of the compound term “radical-revolutionary” is guided by a dual consideration: on the one hand, to distinguish it from those currents of the Left (in its broadest sense) that promote various forms of collaboration with antagonistic classes—currents that can, in general and briefly, be categorized into three groups: “reformist Left,” “overthrowist Left,” and the so-called “Axis of Resistance Left.” On the other hand, this term emphasizes the importance of a certain conceptualization that takes into account the paralyzing split between two simultaneous dimensions (theoretical-ideological concern and organizational-strategic concern) within this radical-revolutionary spectrum. In the remainder of the text, whenever “Left” is mentioned, it refers specifically to this spectrum.
[2] Previously, in various texts, we have elaborated and detailed our position and arguments regarding the relationship between these two questions (“what should be done?” and “what can be done?”). Therefore, here we will suffice with this brief reference.
[3] Although this point may seem obvious, we deemed it necessary to articulate it due to its fundamental importance in our line of reasoning: from the proposition that “the stabilization and continuation of the communist order do not require the reproduction and maintenance of unequal social relations,” one cannot and should not conclude that, consequently, unequal social relations will necessarily not be reproduced within a communist socio-political system. This point will be elucidated with greater clarity in our subsequent explanations.
[4] In common debates, the concept of “revisionism” is sometimes conflated with “reformism.” The common point between these concepts is that both refer to the reform of the system rather than its fundamental transformation. However, a reformist approach can focus on a specific policy within a limited domain, whereas revisionism implies a comprehensive effort aimed at definitively replacing “revolutionary defeat” with all-encompassing reformism through structural and ideological adjustments.
A common mistake regarding the concept of revisionism also involves another aspect, which is often exacerbated by its prevalent translation in Persian as “tajdid-nazar-talabi” (literally “seeking reconsideration”). This gives the impression that opposing revisionism means dogmatically resisting any form of critical rethinking of political and ideological doctrines. It is evident that if this were the case, almost all prominent revolutionary thinkers and leaders from the late nineteenth century to today (including Lenin, Mao, Castro, etc.) would be classified among the greatest revisionists in the history of Marxism.
Thus, revisionism is not synonymous with the enduring critique of doctrines (including the most radical critiques) aimed at refining the revolutionary perspective and overcoming its various obstacles. Instead, it signifies a break from fundamental perspectives and principles in the service of reformist politics. Accordingly, while a revolutionary orientation can at different moments align and cooperate with certain reformist demands, its incompatibility with revisionism is inevitable due to that very comprehensive break.
[5] We are aware that the concept of “sisterhood-brotherhood” may be subject to criticism due to its reproduction of a reductive understanding based on gender dualism. Therefore, we find it necessary to explain the reason for choosing this concept: on one hand, the aim was to use affirmative concepts to describe the egalitarian orders we are discussing. Thus, the concept of “anti-racism” is insufficient for describing the order opposed to “racism.” Another possible choice was “homophily” or “philanthropy.” However, on one hand, the concept of “homophily” might be mistaken for “speciesism,” and on the other hand, “philanthropy” is more of a moral concept than a political one. In the tradition of revolutionary struggle, the concept used in opposition to various forms of racial discrimination is “brotherhood.” To liberate this concept from its masculine gendered burden, we chose the term “sisterhood-brotherhood.” At the same time, we welcome proposals for another conceptual term that is sufficiently political and affirmative and also addresses the risk of reproducing gender dualism.
[6] We find it necessary to repeatedly emphasize this point: as explained at the beginning of the text, the surplus value production system must be understood as a complex and intricate social order with direct and indirect mechanisms, and it cannot be reduced to “the production process at the workplace,” “the wage issue,” or “direct exploitation.” From this perspective, phenomena such as reproductive labor (for example, domestic work), the creation of “central” and “peripheral” zones, colonial crimes, and so forth—despite being external to “value production” (from the capitalist viewpoint)—ensure the “accumulation of capital” through “non-exploitative oppression” and therefore are explainable within the “capitalist order.”
Comment here