Immediately after the ceasefire, in an effort to project an image of a “united nation,” the regime brought figures such as Mohammadreza Jalaeipour onto state television as representatives of so-called national unity. In a live broadcast on the IRIB 6, Jalaeipour described what he called the “moment of becoming a nation” through a highly sentimental scene: The performance of the patriotic anthem Ey Iran, during which women of differing appearances embraced each other in tears. He recounted it this way:
“I just came from Azadi Tower, from a performance by the Tehran Symphony Orchestra attended by a remarkably diverse crowd of citizens; you could see every kind of person there. And in their eyes, you could tell they were experiencing something new. Next to me were two women: one with a scarf on her shoulder, the other wore a full chador. Their eyes met. At one point during the performance of Ey Iran, the woman in the chador turned to the unveiled woman and asked, ‘May I hug you?’ They embraced and cried together. That was the moment of becoming a nation.”
This account, though on the surface projecting a moment of reconciliation and the embrace of diversity, in fact signals the launch of a political project: one in which becoming a nation advances through the reordering of structural fault lines. That moment marks the beginning of a process in which the very contradictions supposedly suspended under the banner of national unity are instead repressed with renewed force. Precisely for this reason, the moment must be taken seriously in the very terms Jalaeipour and his like-minded peers frame it. Across various levels, they reiterate a single theme: “The nation, confronted by an external threat, is born out of crisis.” Yet in reality, what was taking place was yet another attempt to ground the nation not on actual social contradictions, but on a selective reconciliation of some cleavages and the suppression of others.
In Jalaeipour’s narration, the hijab among the most contentious of social fault lines was suddenly transformed into a reconcilable cleavage: a space where the chador-clad woman and the unveiled woman could embrace, their cultural cleavage “resolved” for a fleeting moment. Meanwhile, class divisions, the ones that cut into the very bodies of workers and the poor, directly implicating their struggle for survival, not only have no place in this nation-building rhetoric, but are repressed all the more ruthlessly. The real contradiction is, as always, expelled from the stage of the nation. It is the contradiction that cannot be embraced, wept over, or reconciled, but only suppressed with ever-greater intensity.
Thus, what matters is not merely the symbolic form of this unity, but its deeply classed nature: the “new nation” being described is, on one hand, inextricably linked to the ongoing repression of the working class, effectively built upon the exclusion of socially productive forces, wage laborers, and precarious workers; on the other hand, it exhibits fascistic tendencies. These tendencies are most visibly manifested in the widespread expulsion of Afghan workers and their families from Iran and the intensification of a racist, xenophobic project that was immediately reinforced and implemented after the ceasefire. Simultaneously, in this process of “nation-building,” women without veils, Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis, and other previously marginalized groups are meant to be incorporated, but only on the condition that they set aside the distinctive and conflicting aspects of their identities that diverge from the dominant narrative of the “nation.” In reality, the “nation” continues to be reproduced as a collective identity that is not a reflection of the society’s genuine cleavages, distinctions, and fault lines, but rather a homogenized, artificial version of them. In this way, anyone who insists on mother-tongue education, a woman, a queer person, or any subject who refuses to compromise their difference, can be effortlessly excluded from this reconstructed “nation.”
The mechanism of exclusion, regardless of the level at which it manifests, although often expressed through cultural forms, is rooted in political economy; an institutionalized pattern that simultaneously structures economic and political relations, thereby enabling the structural marginalization of certain groups. In this way, this regime that governs the concurrent distribution of power and wealth continually seeks to preserve and reproduce the monopoly of both in the hands of a particular group by excluding segments of society. This mode of social organization not only determines individuals’ positions within the cultural sphere but also defines their roles in the productive relations of society, either through complete expulsion from the labor cycle or through relative exclusion as cheap, precarious, and powerless labor.
Thus, the entirety of the “national unity” project cannot be reduced to the dramatic narrative of Mohammadreza Jalaeipour. We are confronted with a deeply political-class project, one intent on clearing and paving the long path of capitalism in Iran to prepare it for reestablishment and for navigating the current crisis. Over the years, this project has appeared under multiple guises, differing in how it frames problems and highlights critical junctures; from the ideology known as “Iran-shahri”, which attempts to reconstruct the nation-state through a selective reinterpretation of history, to what Saeed Laylaz, the reformist economist and journalist close to Iran’s security-economic circles, has more explicitly called “Iranian Bonapartism.” On another level, the project has sought to manifest its social form through a right-wing opposition mobilized around slogans like “Reza Shah, may your soul be blessed,” while within the established order it aims to find a figure of a patriotic general or a “nationalist IRGC officer” capable of steering capital through the current decisive crisis via political repression.
In this text, by referring to the explicit and implicit statements of key figures within this current, we will demonstrate that the nation-building forged in the context of war is a project aimed at reproducing the existing order, consolidating the position of capital, and marginalizing social forces whose interests and lived experiences are in fundamental conflict with this structure. Although the propaganda surrounding this nation-building, pursued with intensity in the early days following the ceasefire, has now somewhat subsided, lying in wait for the possible onset of a new round of war and negotiations, existing evidence and trends indicate that significant changes of the same deeply classed character we analyze here are on the horizon. The purpose of this text, beyond analyzing a specific political moment, is to open a discussion about the future trajectory of capital in Iran, whether under the Islamic Republic, a transformed Islamic Republic, or even in its absence.
***
At present, two distinct levels of political reorganization can be observed in Iran. First, at the official level, there exists a kind of suspension between diplomatic deterrence and readiness for renewed military confrontation with the U.S.-Israel axis. Second, at a more strategic level, various segments of the bourgeoisie, both within and outside the structure of the Islamic Republic, are seeking to reproduce a political-economic order capable of securing their class interests within a new framework of capital accumulation.
Initially, with regard to the Islamic Republic, the situation is as follows: in the deeper layers, there are signs of preparation for renewed military confrontation with the U.S. and Israel, while at the more visible diplomatic level, openings toward a form of “soft deterrence” through negotiation with the West can be observed. The diplomatic sphere, whose developments are relatively observable, reveals above all the regime’s uncertainty about its strategies and objectives: is the Islamic Republic moving toward gradual submission? If so, what are the limits of this submission, and what vision of Iran’s future political order does it suggest?
At a deeper level, however, this confusion intersects with another process: one in which representatives of capital in Iran, both within and outside the state, are striving to construct a positive horizon for reproducing their class interests. At this level, confusion gives way to various forms of competition: An ongoing internal conflict exists among different strands of Iranian capitalism, both within the government and among the opposition, over which political force can advance this project. While various opposition factions also claim this role, under current conditions it appears that the political forces within the Islamic Republic, despite their crises, continue to possess the instruments and resources necessary to sustain this trajectory.
In other words, at the official and observable level, there is an oscillation between preparing for military confrontation with the U.S. and Israel on one hand, and opening toward a form of deterrent diplomacy on the other. At this level, what is visible is not a coherent strategy but uncertainty and instability in orientation. It is as if the Islamic Republic is testing multiple paths in parallel, without a clear horizon for victory or compromise. The European troika’s move to activate the snapback mechanism, coupled with the short deadline imposed on Iran, has further complicated the situation while simultaneously limiting the government’s diplomatic options.
At a deeper level, what is unfolding goes beyond this oscillation between war and peace. Here, we are confronted with a project whose central concern is the reconstruction of a political order to secure the class interests of the bourgeoisie. Representatives of this class, both within the government and the opposition, are competing for political ownership of this project. Yet the structural resources and executive capacities embedded within the Islamic Republic, at least in the short term, tip the balance in favor of the forces entrenched in power. The economic and social foundations shaping these “Salvation of Iran” projects comprise a combination of unstable war and ceasefire with the U.S. and Israel, a chronic crisis of capital accumulation, structural incapacity to attract productive investment, widespread capital flight, the collapse of the redistribution system, and the deep erosion of the regime’s political legitimacy following successive uprisings. This crisis has produced an imperative to reconstruct state authority in a centralized, disciplined, and developmentally authoritarian form. From this perspective, attention must be paid to the political models capable of advancing the reconstruction of capitalist order. Could Bonapartism, in its Marxian sense, or as Saeed Laylaz frames it under “Iranian Bonapartism”, be one such possibility? Can the Islamic Republic, in its current or transformed forms, serve as the vehicle for this project? And ultimately, is this project necessarily bound to the Islamic Republic, or can its outlines also be discerned within the opposition?
***
The descriptive use of the concept of Bonapartism to analyze Iran’s political-class situation predates Saeed Laylaz’s formulation of it as a prescription or prediction by a considerable margin. However, Laylaz’s understanding of Bonapartism lacks substantial theoretical depth and does not move beyond a preliminary interpretation of the concept. The application of the term Bonapartism in Iran’s political arena can be broadly categorized: some use it descriptively to characterize the situation (Hassan Azad[1], Kamal Athari[2]); others issue warnings about it (Saeed Hajjarian[3]); some reject its prescriptive or salvational framing as misguided (Kamal Athari, who views it under the notion of a unitary, supra-class state as both undesirable and impossible[4]); and finally, some adopt a prescriptive approach, asserting that Iran is either on this path or should be (Saeed Laylaz with Bonapartism, and Ahmad Zeidabadi with the notion of a unitary governance).[5]
In this text, rather than providing a descriptive review of multiple perspectives, we focus on the Bonapartism project, which has been most prominently reflected in Saeed Laylaz’s analyses and bears his name. Yet its scope is not limited to him or even to a specific faction within the government. This project, despite its differences from the concept of “unitary governance[6],” also receives support or tacit readiness from segments of the right-wing opposition. This alignment is not the result of chance or ideological agreement, but stems from the unified logic of capitalism, which seeks to reproduce itself through a form of authoritarian Bonapartist governance and, in its totality, reflects the logic of capital accumulation in Iran. Through the lens of Bonapartism, we aim to construct a political-class reading of Iran’s current situation and demonstrate why the prescription of Bonapartist governance is not, as some have warned, a mere political aberration, but a structural necessity for the revival of capitalism in Iran.
In this narrative, Bonapartism is portrayed as the only viable solution to save Iran from economic and social collapse, operating through the concentration of political power and the reorganization of class relations to favor capital accumulation. Saeed Laylaz expresses his belief in a Bonapartist governance for Iran as follows: “The issue for Iranian society is efficiency, not who governs. The question is who can resolve Iran’s crises. The three main problems are corruption, inefficiency, and lack of cohesion. For this reason, I imagine that, on Iran’s political horizon, we will see a Bonapartist figure who will assume power for a transitional period of five to ten years, not an eternal term. This is what opponents of the Islamic Republic call ‘Reza Khan, rest in peace,’ and what insiders refer to as the Islamic Reza Khan. Both point toward an authoritarian system. Since the most organized political-security institution in Iran is the IRGC, I believe that Iran’s future must, and will pass through a period of IRGC governance, which will resolve at least two of our three core problems: lack of cohesion and inefficiency. I think this Bonapartism, during its five- to ten-year tenure, will liberate Iran’s cultural and social space, either suddenly or gradually, unleashing immense energy within the country. In foreign policy, it will shift its approach from hostility to competition, as seen in China, Laos, Burma, Vietnam, and Myanmar, while maintaining a firm grip on domestic politics to guide the country through this critical transitional phase.”
This narrative, repeated with minor variations regarding who holds power by the right-wing opposition, most notably the political faction supporting Reza Pahlavi, lacks any illusion of capitalist democratization. Unlike social-democratic leftists or liberal republicans, who imagine that greater transparency and freedom of expression could reconcile capitalism with public interests, Saeed Laylaz, the current he is associated with, and the political faction backing Reza Pahlavi speak from a position of preserving and reconstructing capitalism through iron fists and boots. While most of them, except Laylaz, do not explicitly use the term Bonapartism, the vision they articulate for a desirable political order, a strong, controlling, commanding, yet rational and efficient state, closely resembles Marx’s classical mechanisms of a Bonapartist state. This spectrum, which is engaged in serious disputes over political ownership of this project, contrasts sharply with liberal leftists who still cling to the illusion of “democratic capitalism.” They take at least the contradictions seriously: either free markets or democracy; both cannot coexist.
***
Bonapartism is a form of class domination that emerges at a historical moment when neither of the two main classes of society (the proletariat nor the bourgeoisie) is capable of fully exercising its political power. In this situation, the state appears to become an independent force that, transcending classes in the name of the nation, stability, and law, reconstructs order. Yet this formal autonomy of the state is in practice nothing more than a mechanism to restore bourgeois domination through the suppression of the working class, the containment of social crises, and the preparation of conditions for capital accumulation. In Marx’s analysis of Louis Bonaparte (the Eighteenth Brumaire), the petty landowning peasantry constituted the social force that Bonaparte claimed to represent. Marx demonstrates, however, that this representation was purely formal and ultimately served bourgeois class interests. In contemporary Iran, in the absence of a petty landowning peasantry in the Marxian sense, it is the urban middle class that fulfills this role. The Iranian middle class, having lost part of its previous economic and cultural standing due to structural transformations of capitalism and moving toward proletarianization, has been stripped of independent political agency, and its collective bonds have disintegrated.
In such circumstances, this class, suspended between economic decline and the desire to preserve its former status, becomes not a liberating force but an unstable and reactionary one. Its yearning for a return to stability, prosperity, and “business boom” drives it toward complicity with states that, while authoritarian and repressive, maintain a modern façade. These states, through reformist slogans, lifestyle freedoms, and free-market policies, simultaneously satisfy bourgeois interests and sustain the illusion of regained status for the middle class. This class is prepared to support a state that, though repressive, presents a “modern” exterior, a government capable, through promises of market reconstruction and top-down reforms, of recognizing lifestyle freedoms and advancing technocratic reforms. Like the petty landowning peasants of France, Iran’s urban middle class cannot organize itself as an independent historical force. Consequently, Bonapartism in Iran represents a form of “formal representation” of an unstable social class whose interests are pursued in alignment with overarching capitalism, whether state led or private.
In Bonapartism, the masses occupy a dual role. On one hand, they are removed from the scene as an independent social and political force. On the other hand, they are mobilized as a supportive, decorative, and symbolic force in the service of reconstructing order. In Iran, this process manifested simultaneously and immediately after the twelve-day war through repeated calls for “national unity” and the collective excitement generated by the “moment of becoming a nation.” This unity, which appeared to be cross-class and harmonizing, was in reality a prelude to the consolidation of a project of governance by a military-security-economic power bloc.
In Iran, none of the conditions that might prevent the emergence of Bonapartism currently exist. (This is not to say that in the future, under different circumstances, such conditions could not arise.) Bonapartism emerges when neither of the two main poles of class struggle (bourgeoisie or proletariat) can assert political and social hegemony. In this vacuum, a third force, such as the army, bureaucracy, or a charismatic individual, seizes power as a state that appears to stand “above the classes.” Neither is the proletariat sufficiently organized and powerful enough to seize control and block Bonapartism, nor does capitalism in Iran possess the conditions or capacities to foster a liberal bourgeoisie or, more importantly, to exercise decisive and uncontested dominance over the working class. Given the chronic disorganization of the working class, the disruption of capitalist hegemony does not stem from the rise of an alternative force but from the condition of capital itself in Iran: Capital, as a class, lacks the capacity to democratize its internal relations and remains in a state of perpetual crisis in its relationship with society. To prevent the collapse of hegemony and reproduce social order, it requires an authoritarian savior who, under the banner of “development,” can secure the conditions for continued accumulation.
For this reason, a spectrum of bourgeois forces, having no illusions about a democratic state, has put forward the model of authoritarian rule and the prescription of Bonapartism as a historical necessity. They correctly recognize that rebuilding capitalist discipline requires a centralized, “supraclass,” and powerful state. In Iran, such a state can achieve the stability it seeks only by combining four elements: First, granting individual freedoms in lifestyle choices and addressing the cultural grievances of the educated strata. Second, pursuing more aggressive economic liberalization, privatization, deregulation, and the suppression of labor and independent organizing as preconditions for capital accumulation. Third, moving away from confrontational foreign policies toward the United States and Israel, and initiating normalization and coexistence within the global capitalist order. Fourth, implementing extensive political repression and suspending democracy both in relation to society and in interactions with other domestic bourgeois blocs.
It should be noted that these internal blocs are not simply reducible to the traditional divisions of commercial, industrial, and financial capital, although such distinctions do help to clarify certain internal fractures within the bourgeoisie. In Iran, however, it is evident that many of the dominant actors represent hybrid forms of capital, in which the boundaries between industrial production, financial activity, and state monopolies are deeply intertwined. Consequently, the internal struggle among these blocs is not merely about short-term access to resources or special privileges but about defining the long-term configuration of the state’s relationship with capital, the reorganization of the working class, and the trajectory of integration into the global market. This requires a political struggle between the blocs as carriers of conflicting projects within the bourgeoisie. Yet since these blocs have historically emerged not through progressive social organization or revolutionary upheaval, but rather through uneven access to state power, special privileges, and reliance on mechanisms of repression, the possibility of institutionalized or democratic competition among them is foreclosed. As the logic of Bonapartism suggests, the state thus enters the scene as an ostensibly “independent” arbiter, tasked with imposing a stabilizing balance while managing and containing the divergent interests within the bourgeoisie.
In this way, capital in Iran remains bound to a fundamentally undemocratic mode of internal relations, relying on the mediation of an “benevolent dictatorship” to overcome economic and social crises. Yet this transitional period, through the uncompromising enforcement of class repression, gradually opens the path for other bourgeois blocs to enter the terrain of the free market economy. What emerges, therefore, is a form of economic democratization that is paradoxically the product of political and class repression. In this process, the Bonapartist state, under the banner of order, stability, and efficiency, effectively reduces politics to technocracy, while the police, security apparatuses, and propaganda machinery foreclose any space for autonomous social organization or radical alternatives.
This four-sided strategy constitutes the real substance of a project that, in the discourse of these political currents, is collectively named the “salvation of Iran.” The project, however, is presented under a variety of labels and narratives: from “Bonapartism,” to “management of emergency phase” (as articulated by monarchist circles), to “the transitional period” and similar formulations. Despite the differences in language and form, the underlying content remains nearly identical: an authoritarian response to the crisis of capitalism in Iran.[7]
***
In March 2025, Saeed Leylaz, in an interview with Shargh newspaper titled “The Aftershocks of Trump’s Encounter with Zelensky” conducted together with Mashallah Shamsolvaezin, referred to Trump’s treatment of Zelensky and the humiliation involved. He said: “I have been considering writing an article or a book to dispel several illusions about the rise of Mr. Trump and America’s recent behavior that have taken hold among intellectuals and elites worldwide, most of whom are, in fact, rather pitiable creatures. The first illusion is democracy, since nothing called democracy actually exists. The second is the separation of powers, which Lenin rightly described as nothing more than a myth, and which has been disproven a thousand times. The third is freedom. The fourth is the free market economy, which even now is being pitifully parroted in Iranian media. The fifth is courtesy and diplomatic etiquette.”
After Leylaz’s remarks, it was Shamsolvaezin’s turn to say: “The world is on the threshold of a strategic transformation in global affairs. Do we even have the time to pursue long-term efforts to bridge the gap between state and society? […] The extraordinary situation we are now facing grants the ruling establishment the right to say: put aside theoretical debates, the world is experiencing tremors, and as a key country in West Asia I must immediately secure my position. New powers are emerging […] Mr. Leylaz pointed to a very precise issue: what happened in the White House has destroyed several principles of democracy, diplomacy, and so on. Why should it not be legitimate, if Iran finds itself in a state of emergency, for the government to repeat the same line, that I am in a semi-war situation, not war but not peace either, so let us drop the peripheral discussions and instead focus on critical, decisive, strategic matters?”
Leylaz then continues: “I have theorized your point [Shamsolvaezin’s] in the framework of Bonapartism, and I still believe that Iran’s future will pass through this path, actively seeking a pretext for a military junta to come to power and implement fundamental reforms [….] The Bonaparte that is to emerge will undertake sweeping reforms within a closed and centralized political order, and the current exceptional international circumstances will in fact assist this process […] Especially now that the time for painful reforms in Iran has arrived, we no longer have the means or resources to purchase legitimacy from the people, as was the case under Mr. Ahmadinejad […] The reforms we are speaking of are not optional reforms. In Iran, no one will ever carry out reforms voluntarily, as a matter of choice […] They will be compelled to do so, and as in Mr. Rouhani’s era, will one day make a sudden decision, saying: we can no longer continue as before; for example, with fuel distribution in its present form. These international developments may even accelerate this process, hastening its birth and granting it greater legitimacy. Within the framework of this closed political system that will become established in the country, social and cultural issues, as well as certain freedoms, will be left aside, signs of which can already be seen in society, but politically, the space will be tightly closed.”
The four-sided strategy we outlined earlier, and which, here and in other conversations, is explicitly articulated by Saeed Leylaz with the assistance of Shamsolvaezin does not remain confined to public commentary. What we are confronting goes beyond individual positions. We are witnessing a deeper discursive shift among intellectuals and elites close to the technocratic and capitalist establishment; a shift that gradually redefines from within the key concepts of the earlier development discourse. In this new narrative, the familiar insistence on the necessity of independent institutions such as an “impartial judiciary,” an “independent central bank,” the “rule of law,” or even “political development” is no longer visible. These elements are either marginalized altogether or temporarily suspended under the labels of “long-term goals” and “postponable ideals,” so that the “immediate necessity of establishing a strong state” can take their place. Within this intellectual framework, parts of which we will address further, the state must first be established with “iron fist,” restore order, and only then, if successful, perhaps allow for institution-building and democracy at some undefined point in the future. Thus, even the most liberal elements of the Iranian bourgeoisie, who once entered the arena with the pose of defending civil society and citizens’ rights, have now themselves become promoters of an authoritarian order and of “development from above.” It is at the intersection of this political shift that slogans such as “Reza Shah, may your soul be blessed” and representations like the “Islamic Reza Khan” find their real meaning within the project of capitalist restoration in Iran. Here the roots of this political turn, and the way in which such an authoritarian project has come to be normalized as “common sense” are revealed. In this project, right-wing forces both inside and outside the country including the technocrats of the Islamic Republic, even if their political struggles over ownership of the project remain unresolved, have converged within a shared ideology: the strong, modern, developmentalist, and decidedly anti-working-class “savior state.”
Part of this political shift can be seen in an interview titled “Political Consolidation and Development, Productive Capitalism, and Industrial Policy” conducted by Mohammad Fazeli with Mohsen Yazdanpanah in May 2025, published in the early weeks of the ceasefire.[8] In introducing the conversation, Fazeli presents it as a response to the impasse of classical development theories, one grounded in free markets and the other in good institutions. He writes that in the absence of both, one must consider a model that makes development possible within an order lacking the rule of law. Mohsen Yazdanpanah, in turn, describes contemporary Iran as precisely such an order and seeks to chart a path from within it toward “creative wealth creation” and a “productive state.” Along this path, he employs concepts such as de-dollarization, intermediate elites, and the contrast between a distributive state and a productive state.
In this conversation, Fazeli and Yazdanpanah attempt to show that in the absence of free markets and good institutions, development must be conceived within the framework of a “political order without the rule of law.” Through the conceptual formulation of “political consolidation” and by situating contemporary Iran within that framework, Mohsen Yazdanpanah [along with Fazeli] seeks to outline strategies for wealth creation through the strengthening of a productive state: “The important point I want to raise is this: reaching this position is inherently paradoxical. You assume that the leader or political elite in Iran suffers from moral failings in their conduct, that they do not act as they should, and that this has led the country astray. Yet this assumption contradicts the very foundations of the intellectual current whose recommendations brought us here. That current holds that a leader, a political elite, naturally pursues personal gain, and that good institutions can restrain this and turn it into public benefit. Therefore, to arrive at good institutions, we end up in a kind of moralistic, prophetic discourse, asking the political leader: why are you not virtuous? But in doing so, we undermine our own theoretical foundations, since those foundations never assume virtuous leadership; for them, institutions are what matter. So, we are confronted with a loop. The developmentalist current that I argue has been in place since the 1980s does not fall into this contradiction. They argue that good institutions are less the cause of development than its outcome. And the premise for initiating a developmental process is accepting the structure of power as a given, not as an ideal. The more precise term I use for this is ‘political consolidation’, an order that, independent of formal rules or official institutions, has produced a certain stability. Any positive transformation must occur in accordance with the exigencies of this political consolidation. Institutionalists say: if you have good institutions, you will develop; factories will be built, creative wealth will be generated. But then the question is: since we do not have those institutions, does that mean creative wealth creation cannot take place? […] From this perspective, once you begin to develop and achieve successes, those accumulate and gradually give rise to institutions. Step by step, by building success, you can construct good institutions upon that foundation. So, in this approach, good institutions are not the solution in themselves; rather, the path runs through political consolidation.”
What is absent from this narrative is an analysis of the class relations that make such an order possible. For Yazdanpanah, the “order without law” represents the institutionalized form of capital’s domination in a crisis context, a form that not only fails to produce productive development but also lays the groundwork for reproducing a coalition of privileged classes, alongside various levels of repression and unequal distribution. Contrary to its “lawless” appearance, this order is highly institutionalized, stabilized within the framework of a peripheral neoliberal accumulation regime, and sustained through the elimination or weakening of democratic institutions, including labor organizations. This enables the continuation of accumulation through resource expropriation, labor repression, and unproductive exploitation. Within such a structure, the order is not lawless but rather lacks legitimacy in the eyes of the working class. It persists only through the combined reliance on institutionalized violence, class-based privilege for intermediate layers, and the alignment of the state with privileged blocks. Behind this technical description of order lies a particular ontology of development, one that seeks to ensure the continuity of exploitative and unequal production relations and class conflict through the expansion of state administrative capacity. Such an analysis reduces development to a managerial level, largely ignoring its historically oppressive social context, yet this managerial level, bureaucratic in nature, carries immense potential for generating a state apparatus of violence. This reduction is accompanied by an ideological mechanism that, by fabricating the notion of “public good” as the aim of the order, seeks to present the class interests of privileged groups as public benefits. In Mohammad Fazeli’s interview with Mohsen Yazdanpanah, from this perspective, the concept of “political consolidation” repeatedly emerges as the central pivot of development. This approach aligns with the simplified framework Fazeli and Yazdanpanah employ to present two views of development. First, the institutionalist view, which treats good institutions as the precondition for development. Second, a contrary view, which sees institutions as the product of successful development, free markets, and identifies political consolidation as the starting point: “Step by step, build success; on the foundation of success, you can construct good institutions.” However, this blurring of temporal and causal priorities does not tell its audience why, from the historical experience of development in so-called “developed” countries, not even a shadow of liberal democracy emerged. Moreover, the liberal democracy that is often cited as a model is itself retreating even in countries supposedly possessing stable democratic systems. It is precisely within this context, as Saeed Leylaz and Mashallah Shamsolvaezin argue, from the perspective of international conditions and the crisis of liberal democracy in the West, that the conditions in Iran appear favorable for the establishment of a Bonapartist government.
In fact, in Fazeli and Yazdanpanah’s narrative, “political consolidation” is the theoretical formulation of the same project that Saeed Leylaz has repeatedly identified as “Iranian Bonapartism”: the rescue of capitalism through a strong state. This perspective, by referencing modern state-building, effectively proposes a return to projects reminiscent of Reza Shah for the right-wing opposition; projects that pursue authoritarian development at the cost of working-class repression, the strengthening of privileged groups, and the elimination of social forces. From this standpoint, “political consolidation” aimed at creating a productive state and preparing the preconditions for a free market can be realized only through the organized intensification of working-class repression, both as a tool of accumulation and as its structural consequence.
It is within this framework that the open letter signed by 180 economists and university professors, published in the early days of the ceasefire, gains significance. Despite its technical language and apparently non-authoritarian tone, the letter essentially outlines a roadmap for a unified state. Even if some signatories individually distance themselves from a unitary government and Bonapartism, the collective emphasis of the letter on a trajectory, each signatory having contributed in some way to its advancement through structural reforms, price liberalization, subsidy removal, and uncompromising implementation of free-market principles, practically paves the way for the same strong, centralized state whose objective is the reconstruction of capitalist order.
The most prominent signatories of this letter, Abbas Akhoundi, Masoud Nili, and Mousa Ghani-Nejad have, over the years, not only been advocates and promoters of the necessity of a free market in Iran, but have also played an undeniable role, as ministers and advisors in key capitalist institutions such as the Ministry of Economy and the Chamber of Commerce, in formulating policies that repress the working class. In this letter, published under the pretext of the twelve-day war, they employ rhetoric about the nation, national unity, and the need to defend against foreign aggression, while using the technical language previously noted to demand that: “Monetary, foreign exchange, trade, and fiscal policies be structured in a way that eliminates opportunities for rent-seeking and corruption.” Yet the true meaning of these statements has already been revealed through their prior prescriptions and practical actions, targeted assaults on the working class and, despite their rhetoric about “freedom,” opposition to modern rights.
For example, in an interview with Mohammad Mashinchian (2023), Mousa Ghani-Nejad presents a view in which the free market is depicted in explicit coexistence with political and cultural authoritarianism. Although he does not explicitly mention Bonapartism, his argument provides the theoretical foundation for accepting it as a means to maintain order, protect private property, and open the way for the encroachment of the free market into public education in Iran: “Hayek says that the family is the most important pillar of freedom in the modern world and in human civilization. Hayek argues that if the family institution is destabilized, freedom itself disappears. He explains why this is the case. He says that in the modern democratic society, the family is what prevents the state from taking over the upbringing of human beings. Otherwise, you would have to send your child to school. In democratic societies like England and France, where the school teaches only a secular culture (non-secular culture is prohibited in public schools in France) this restriction actually cancels out freedom. So, what guarantees and preserves the freedom of the child? It is the family. The family at home tells the child that not everything taught at school is neutral; state education carries the ideology of the state. How is it that people do not understand that the family is a crucial institution for preserving freedom?”.[9]
The above quote from Ghani-Nejad demonstrates that, in his view, attacks on the working class and the denial of modern rights are closely intertwined, and that the realization of “freedom” under the concept of the free market is so flexible and socially controlled that it can even be achieved under the shadow of the Islamic Republic. From this perspective, strengthening the hierarchy of power within the family, a stable form of working-class subjugation, together with opposition to free education, is part of the project to consolidate capitalist order. If, in a place like France, the formation and consolidation of capitalism depended on the liberation of workers from pre-capitalist relations, in a country like Iran, if the consolidation of capitalism requires the restoration or reinforcement of those relations as tools of control and obedience, then they must be embraced. In this sense, the “freedom” advocated by free-market proponents is precisely rooted in the same logic as their economic framework. Just as the “free market” in practice amounts to nothing more than the removal of legal and institutional barriers to accumulation, the “freedom” they champion in legal and social spheres amounts to nothing more than the capitalist’s liberty to reproduce domination. Recall the point made at the outset of this text: in the nation-building project that constitutes the social content of an authoritarian state, “any subject who resists their differences is easily excluded from this reconstructed ‘nation.’” Consequently, the openness in “individual freedoms regarding lifestyle and the alleviation of cultural grievances,” identified as one of the four elements of the Bonapartist quadrilateral strategy mentioned earlier, will, in authoritarian fashion, subtract the radical dimensions of modern rights and place them outside the boundaries of the social order.
On the other hand, the spectrum of liberal economists in Iran, despite their differences regarding the role of the state, the market, or foreign policy, share a common point: the solutions they propose to overcome the current situation are extremely difficult and “painful,” requiring public endurance, enforcement of order, and acceptance of austerity policies. It is within this framework that Masoud Nili’s essay titled “Iran and the Decisive Crossroads” should be read.[10] In this essay, he emphasizes the difficulty and harshness of the proposed solutions: “These imbalances have already made life difficult for every Iranian, and in the near future, even the land for which much blood has been shed to preserve every inch will become largely uninhabitable and worthless. The solutions to reduce or eliminate these imbalances are painful and extremely difficult, requiring public tolerance, broad societal cooperation, and the utilization of global capacities, resources, and technology.”
The imbalance that Masoud Nili refers to encompasses not only reforms to the banking and budgetary systems, but also the reduction of unnecessary government expenditures, reform of the subsidy system, adjustment of energy pricing, reform of the pension system and state-managed funds, a review and increase of the retirement age, greater participation of workers in insurance contributions, reduction of the financial burden on the government, and partial privatization of fund management. These areas simultaneously reveal that the pain of correcting these imbalances, and what is presented as “economic surgery” is not primarily due to obstruction by banking stakeholders or budgetary rent-seekers, but rather to its class-based nature. While the unequal structure of wealth distribution, special economic privileges, and tax exemptions for upper-class groups, because they constitute a key part of the ruling power bloc, are not meant to be subject to “reforms,” the burden of this economically brutal surgery, with all its devastating effects, falls squarely on the working class and urban poor.
Although Masoud Nili, in his essay, presents sovereignty as derived from the will of the people and speaks of public oversight and evaluation of government performance, and does not explicitly propose the establishment of a unitary authoritarian state, he nonetheless reveals an internal tension among liberal economists. Yet this tension remains largely superficial. This aspect of his position is what led a left-leaning economist like Mohammad Malju, in an interview organized by Azad Media as a YouTube program, to label Nili as “left” among right-wing economists. Despite his distance from explicit authoritarian models, Nili remains firmly within the logic of crisis-ridden capitalism, describing the solutions to these imbalances as a set of “painful” measures, reforms that can only be implemented with broad societal compliance. However, he never explains how such compliance is to be achieved, except through the same path that leads to the establishment of a strong, “developmental” state; a state that other figures within this spectrum more explicitly refer to as a “Bonapartist state” and advocate for its swift emergence on the political scene.
Thus, the logic underpinning the statement by 180 economists, the positions of its signatories, and Nili’s essay, emphasizing themes such as national unity, the fight against corruption, and the free market, falls squarely within the same analytical framework that Fazaeli and Leylaz use to justify the necessity of “establishing consolidation” and “Bonapartism” as prerequisites for development. The primary aim of this establishment is not to open a path toward democracy, social justice, or participatory institutions, but rather to create a suitable foundation for implementing the free-market model. In this sense, they continue to operate within the dominant development paradigm, a paradigm in which the market occupies the ultimate position in development. The difference is that, given Iran’s current situation, they consider the full realization of a free market impossible without a strong state, one capable of first establishing the necessary infrastructure for the market, including through the suppression of working-class resistance and the removal of social obstacles to full economic liberalization.
In other words, what Fazaeli, Leylaz, and other advocates of this development model seek is the reconstruction of the same historical trajectory that accompanied the rise of capitalism in the West: a strong state that, through non-capitalist mechanisms, employs coercion, intimidation, and instruments of repression to create the conditions for primitive accumulation of capital. They correctly recognize that capitalism did not emerge without active and violent state intervention, and from this recognition, they prescribe an authoritarian solution: the state must possess sufficient coercive power to establish the infrastructure for sustained accumulation.
This approach, however, is not limited to theoretical or technocratic analysis. Socially, this logic gradually transforms into a political ideal that, through cultural and nostalgic representations, embeds the desire for authority in the collective consciousness. In other words, the idea of a strong state capable of paving the way for development is not merely a top-down project; it is also reflected and reinforced within social layers. The aim here is to organize a form of “pressure from below” in favor of establishing authority. From this perspective, one can recognize the signs of this ideal in street slogans such as “Reza Shah, may your soul be blessed,” that is, the depiction of a powerful savior to create a mental framework conducive to accepting a Bonapartist state.
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What has been presented here as an analysis of Bonapartism is not a description of the current, consolidated situation, but an effort to understand the intellectual and political outlook of a segment of the bourgeoisie in response to the crisis of accumulation and to outline their particular preparations for a future moment when the bourgeoisie may be compelled to declare a “state of emergency.” The reference to the Bonapartist model does not assume the inevitable realization or unification of sovereignty under such a system; rather, it indicates that in the current crisis arising from internal conflicts, structural contradictions of Iranian capitalism, and increasing social resistance, capital is moving toward a specific form of authoritarian reconstruction of order.
Among possible scenarios, however, the Bonapartist model or its authoritarian equivalents appear to be the most likely path for the restoration of capitalist order in Iran. A large segment of the social-democratic left and liberal democrats, who place their hopes in democratization, have failed to grasp this trajectory and its real drivers. In practice, the extreme pro–free-market right, both within and outside the Islamic Republic, represents the most effective and coherent force preparing this project and its main partners. Within this framework, internal actors of the Islamic Republic possess key advantages such as governance instruments and security-military networks, enabling them to advance the project on a national scale. The exiled far-right, while lacking executive tools, can serve as a facilitating force, disruptor of alternative paths, and ultimately as a backup plan (Plan B).
As noted, the scenario of establishing a Bonapartist order, while the most likely path for restoring capitalist order under the current crisis, is neither certain nor free of obstacles. Progressive alternatives remain possible, and at the forefront of these, the only force with the potential to effectively counter such a project is the Iranian working class. This, however, is not in its current scattered, passive, and unorganized state, but only if it can recognize itself as a class, aware of its interests and political mission, and act as a unified, uncompromising force.
The Iranian working class, understood broadly to include laborers, the unemployed, and urban poor, is the only force capable not only of preventing the formation of such an order but also of paving the way for a radical social transition. This will only be possible if the class refuses to accept the present situation as an “absolute blockage,” instead seizing upon the real possibilities embedded within the crisis and organizing itself as a class committed to gaining political power and demanding structural social and economic change. In this sense, the creation of alternatives does not rely on official mechanisms or external powers, but on the working class, as a historical force, defining its horizon beyond minor reforms and intra-systemic shifts, and taking the initiative into its own hands.
This political reconstruction is not possible without active intervention across multiple levels of struggle:
From revisiting the diverse experiences of workers’ councils, local committees, and forms of independent organization, to linking scattered labor and livelihood resistances with broader political horizons. This requires strengthening the historical memory of the labor movement, generating knowledge from below, and expanding collective capacities for solidarity among different groups and segments of the working class.
At the same time, it is necessary to rethink concepts such as identity, nation, security, and development as reproduced in official ideology, and to expose their role in obstructing class interests, in order to redefine fundamental concepts such as justice, welfare, and democracy from the perspective of the working class. Only then can the working class become a force capable of a radical break with the capitalist order. This political reconstruction cannot occur without active material intervention at multiple levels of struggle.
Yet, one must not be seduced by the prevailing fancies of spontaneous self-determination and assume that the working class will, on a pleasant morning, suddenly and automatically resolve to make a radical break and intervene materially. Like any other class, the working class requires tools and intermediaries for effective intervention in a manner that produces a radical rupture. Chief among these are the party or parties and the organic organizations of the class. It is important to clarify that a party or organic organization does not necessarily have to emerge solely from within the class itself. If it does, so much the better; but the crucial factor is the class orientation of the party or organization, and that it derives its intervention in class struggle not from above the class but from the ongoing, daily metabolism of the class struggle itself.
Within this process, the working class, as a class seeking to seize political power and fundamentally transform social and economic relations, can assert itself as a class. But this is only possible if the current situation is understood not as a dead-end but as a crisis-laden moment, full of gaps and possibilities; a moment that requires grasping these gaps and building a revolutionary alternative, starting here and now.
Reference
[1] In his article “A Look at the Concept of Political Capitalism” on Naqd website, Hassan Azad writes: “In my view, the term Bonapartism is better suited to analyze the political-economic structure of the regime that emerged from the 1979 Revolution. During the revolution, a coalition of Shia clergy (particularly supporters of velayat-e faqih), the Islamic Coalition bodies (representing the bazaar and traditional petty bourgeoisie), along with certain other strands of political Islam and urban poor (masses alienated from the material conditions of their production and reproduction), seized power under Khomeini’s leadership in a society where capitalist modes of production had become dominant. It is evident that the incongruity between this form of political power and prevailing social relations generates numerous problems at both micro- and macroeconomic levels. The shifts in the power bloc and the movement of groups within its hierarchy since the revolution is a complex topic that deserves separate treatment, yet the fundamental mismatch between political authority and economic relations has persisted, despite minor fluctuations, and has in fact intensified over time.”
[2] Kamal Athari on Iran Farda Telegram: “For more than two decades, in my interviews, articles, and lectures at the Porsesh Institute, I have examined the processes through which various supra-class states in Iran have emerged and fallen. Briefly, the Iranian state has been Bonapartist since the Constitutional Revolution and remains so today; that is, the major classes have never been able to fully exercise hegemony. At times, the state has pursued developmental policies, while at other times it has been anti-developmental.”
[3] Saeed Hajjarian, in a 2001 note titled “Yes to 18 Khordad, no to 18 Brumaire,” wrote: “The 18th of Brumaire marks Napoleon III’s coup, when, after the French Revolution, he seized an opportunity to rally urban mobs, carry out a coup, suspend the republic, crown himself, and declare the empire in France, remaining emperor for 19 years until he was overthrown and the republic restored.” In analyzing this event, Hajjarian identifies Napoleon III’s social base as the marginalized sectors of production, the lumpen proletariat, rogues and mobsters, and a reserve army of unemployed, so-called socially expelled forces. Then he asked: “will we see similar sectors in Iran? Will unemployment, addiction, and vandalism persist, and will we have a reserve army of the unemployed? If so, we must anticipate a Bonapartist figure. Bonapartism represents a milder form of fascism, and thus, in my view, the social foundations of Bonapartism are already present in the future horizon (as I noted in that article). We are therefore confronted with another paradox: the paradox of democratism and Bonapartism.”
[4] Kamal Athari on Iran Farda Telegram: “Defending a unified, integrated, supra-class developmental state, which could evolve into a welfare state, stands in contrast to a unitary state that, even if developmental, reaches a dead end due to its lack of integration with civil society. A Bismarckian supra-class state, provided the necessary groundwork is laid for widespread welfare and the democratic maturity of society, contrasts with a Bonapartist supra-class state. Max Weber, in an open letter to the Liberal Party, argued that one cannot take Bismarck’s achievements, such as social security, away from the German people and leave society to the market; and to the socialists he said, you cannot nationalize the economy beyond what Bismarck has done. He warned both class-based parties that neither has a convincing program for the German nation, and under such conditions, extra-legal, charismatic figures would seize power; a scenario Weber deemed extremely dangerous for Germany.
[5] Ahmad Zeidabadi, a reformist political activist, has in recent years frequently defended the idea of a unitary governance. However, his arguments lack theoretical and political coherence, and therefore it is not possible to cite a specific passage from him that clearly conveys the essence of this idea in his own words.
[6] Although the terms “unitary governance” and “Bonapartism” are often used interchangeably in many analyses including in some parts of this text, it is important to note that Bonapartism does not merely signify a unitary state. Rather, it represents a classic, more complex, and deeper form of that concept. Beyond the concentration of political power in the hands of a narrow bloc, Bonapartism involves features such as the symbolic mobilization of the masses and the creation of a specific political-social cohesion that helps stabilize capitalist order in times of crisis. In Iran, weaker and incomplete forms of Bonapartism, what we refer to as unitary governance, may emerge, yet these lack the capacity to resolve the structural crises of capitalism and therefore cannot be considered fully equivalent to Bonapartism.
[7] Although the historical roots and political horizons of currents such as the monarchists and the technocrats within the Islamic Republic differ, a structural convergence between them has emerged in response to the crisis of capital accumulation in Iran. This convergence stems from a shared pursuit of an authoritarian solution to rescue a capitalism in deep crisis. The main danger, therefore, lies not in overlooking their distinctions, but in portraying these forces as entirely separate projects. What temporarily places these heterogeneous projects on the same plane is the imperative of reconstructing capitalist order at a moment when democratic and hegemonic instruments have lost their efficacy.
[8] See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LDpK7qtYk9E
[9] See Mousa’s Flirtations with the Theocratic State in Defense of Capital here: https://t.me/SarKhatism/40390
[10] Masoud Nili, “Iran and the Decisive Crossroads”, Donyay-e Eghtesad.
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