In the wake of the December 2025-January 2026 protests, we find ourselves in a situation in which those individuals and forces that have defined their political line simultaneously in opposition to the Islamic Republic, in opposition to the monarchy, and, more broadly, in opposition to fascism, are all striving to find a way to confront a danger that we now feel breathing down our necks: the danger that the chain of emancipatory struggles of recent years, decades, and even more than a century in Iran will be appropriated to the benefit of a thoroughly reactionary and monopolistic current, one that undoubtedly counts among the most serious enemies of the ideals of freedom and equality in our contemporary history.
As the Islamic Republic’s repressive and exploitative apparatus has deprived much of society of the means of survival and brutally crushed all protest, and in the absence of a tangible progressive alternative, the reactionary current we previously called the “Pahlavi Organization” managed to impose its hegemony over the media, as well as over minds and even the streets, taking a major step toward political power.
There is no doubt that, contrary to the round-the-clock propaganda of the mainstream media, those driven to the brink who poured into the streets and stood firm against the burning bullets of the repressive apparatus were not all enamored of and awaiting the royal arrival of Reza Pahlavi, nor were they all demanding the restoration of the overthrown monarchy. Reliable field reports confirm that many protesters did not join in the dominant reactionary slogans supporting the former regime and its crownless heir. Many others, too, repeated the name shouted by the leaders not out of conviction but out of desperation and a lack of any visible horizon. Those same reports, however, all attest to the organized intervention and hegemony of that reactionary current within the protests. To deny or even downplay this reality is an unambiguous sign of political irresponsibility.
In such circumstances, the effort to forge a broad anti-reactionary resistance, against reaction in power and reaction lying in wait for power, is not only understandable and justifiable, but a historical duty weighing upon the shoulders of every progressive force. Yet one cannot and must not approach the form, nature, and strategic horizon of such a resistance negligently, despite the urgency of the situation or under the pretext of it. On the contrary, it is precisely this historical urgency that has descended upon our backs like a whip, reminding us that no opportunity remains to repeat the mistakes committed time and again.
One of the voices frequently heard these days from within the Iranian left stresses the need to form a coalition or a united front. It would be composed of various anti-dictatorship, anti-monarchy, and anti-fascist forces; in short, the “democratic forces.”
At first glance, in response to such calls often raised by individuals affiliated with different strands of the left on their personal social media pages, in private correspondence, or in interviews with small and large media outlets, we might say: why not?
Participating in the formation of such a front at historical junctures like this, when the danger of a fascist resurgence looms over the just struggles of the oppressed more than ever, is neither inherently forbidden nor an unprecedented innovation. At times, it becomes an unavoidable necessity on the agenda of revolutionary forces.
Let us therefore state clearly and honestly: the aim of this text is not a blind or dogmatic opposition to the principle of “coalition” or “front-building.” Rather, it is an attempt to clarify the material and fundamental conditions for the success and effectiveness of this hypothetical front. It must be capable of acting as a real barrier against reaction, whether in power or in opposition. And it must not stand in contradiction to the foundational principles and historical horizon of the revolutionary left.
In this regard, the most important challenge facing forces identified with the revolutionary left concerns the very meaning of “front” and “coalition.”
Ontologically and historically, these concepts refer to the linkage and unity in action of organized forces. These forces pursue their own independent and distinct policies. At the same time, out of historical necessity and urgency, they place their organizational capacities at the service of a common struggle against a common enemy.
We should be clear: the urgency of our present situation, the need to wage an effective and broad struggle against organized fascistic tendencies inside and outside the ruling order, does not suspend this basic principle in the definition of a “front” or “coalition.” On the contrary, it makes its importance even more pronounced.
To put it more plainly: the struggle against organized reactionary currents must itself be organized.
At the same time, one decisive and non-negotiable precondition of organization is coherence. Coherence in ideas. Coherence in practice. Coherence in identifying the subject of struggle. Coherence in forms of political intervention suited to the material life and subjective conditions of that identified subject. And coherence in outlining a historical horizon and a concrete understanding of the question of political power.
In the absence of such coherence, struggle becomes accidental. It becomes undisciplined and scattered. It lacks a material base. It lacks effective capacity for intervention. At best, it is reduced to mere propaganda, perhaps even to populism.
Such a struggle does not measure up to the urgency of our historical moment. It will in no way be able to confront the dangers mentioned above.
Therefore, any front or coalition that has even minimal concern for effectiveness under present conditions must be composed of forces that possess a certain degree of organization. They must be able to place part of their organizational capacities, and what they have actually organized, or are in the process of organizing, at the service of the front’s common struggle against the common enemy.
One might respond that the “united front” itself could become the starting point and the framework for this very effort at organization and organizing.
But this is precisely where the question of “coherence,” as a precondition of organization, imposes itself on our discussion.
By definition, a front or coalition is a gathering place for different and diverse forces. These forces have different ideologies. They have different understandings of “action” and political “power.” They also relate to different subjects in the sphere of social life and in the field of political struggle.
For example, let us imagine a united front that brings together forces from various strands of the revolutionary left, forces affiliated with republican currents, and forces emerging from oppressed nations within the geography of Iran, focused on the national question. They unite around a common struggle against a common enemy: the reactionary duality of the Islamic Republic and the restoration of the monarchy.
The immediate question is: what do we mean by “forces”? Do we mean organizations that represent each of these tendencies? Or merely individuals who, at the level of ideology, identify themselves with one of these tendencies? Let us briefly examine both hypotheses.
In the first case, if by “forces” we mean political organizations, we can logically speak of a kind of “synergy.” This is the very rationale of a “front.”
The reason is clear. Each of these organizations, based on its worldview, its political prescriptions, its specific forms of intervention and struggle, and the horizon it draws for future struggles and social order, addresses a particular segment of society. It is capable of building a material base and organizing struggle within that segment. This remains true even if, at times, it addresses society as a whole under broad and general titles such as “the people.”
A revolutionary left organization, if it is truly an organization and not merely a name on paper, should, in principle, be able to find and organize its material-social base primarily within the working class in the broad sense. This includes industrial and service workers, precarious workers, retirees, the unemployed, the urban poor, and reproductive laborers, including housewives.
Organizations affiliated with the republican current, by contrast, tend, due to their political and class characteristics to enjoy more direct and immediate support among the urban middle class and segments of the petty bourgeoisie dissatisfied with the status quo. Of course, depending on economic and political variables in different situations, this social base may shift between right-wing and left-wing republicans.
Organizations struggling around the question of national oppression naturally possess a different and often stronger material base and organizational capacity among oppressed nations.
In this way, each of these forces can provide real, distinct, and unique capacities for struggle against fascism or despotism, both organizationally and socially. This is what makes their presence and participation in forming a “front” or “coalition” meaningful.
Before turning to the second case, two clarifications are necessary to prevent possible misunderstandings.
First, this classification should not be understood mechanically. We should not overlook the real overlaps among parts of the subjects of struggle of these different organizations.
For example, as we have emphasized many times elsewhere, we believe that every revolutionary left organization must place the liberation of oppressed peoples within the geography of Iran on its agenda with equal importance to other forms of oppression. On this basis, the subject of liberation from national oppression must also be understood as a subject of struggle for the revolutionary left.
This prescription, however, does not negate the fact that, in the current situation, organizations formed around the struggle against national oppression in these regions, due to natural and historical reasons possess greater material access and capacity for organizing there.
On the other hand, within this hypothetical front we can imagine the presence of one or more organizations from oppressed peoples that are simultaneously affiliated with one of the other two groups (the revolutionary left or the republicans).
The second point is this: emphasizing the specific social base of each organized tendency does not mean that these organizations must limit themselves only to that base or refrain from addressing other segments of society.
The issue is that, both logically and historically, an organization’s appeal to other social forces can be truly meaningful and effective only if it derives its credibility from its material organization within its own specific social base.
In other words, a current affiliated with the revolutionary left that is incapable of building even the smallest material base among the lower and exploited classes will also be inarticulate when addressing the middle class. In most cases, instead of drawing segments of the middle class toward revolutionary left thought and practice, it will gradually drift away from its left and revolutionary orientation and become a force serving middle-class ideology and politics.
Conversely, an organization that addresses society as a whole on the basis of national oppression, but lacks a material and organized base among its own people, cannot hope to find a receptive audience in the center or among other oppressed peoples.
In the second case, we are dealing with a gathering of individuals or unorganized groups. They lack even the smallest material capacity for organization. They are merely inclined, at the level of ideology, toward one of the above tendencies.
Some of these individuals may even have a history of struggle, imprisonment, or exile. Yet they do not belong to a specific organization with concrete organizational capacities and a real, even if limited, material base.
The immediate question is this: what, in reality, are such “forces” supposed to “synergize”?
Which organizational capacities are they supposed to place at the service of the common struggle within the front?
What social capacity do they possess, and in which sector of society, that they can add to the social capacities of other forces in other sectors?
What weapons, however small but at least somewhat sharpened, are they supposed to pool within the front to strengthen the struggle against the common enemy?
The bitter but undeniable truth is that such a front, if it can even be called a front, is nothing but an “aggregation of nothings.” And it is clear that nothing added to nothing produces nothing.
Another question arises in this second case. It concerns the organizational form of the front’s activity.
Is this front supposed to function as a forum composed of individuals with different political and ideological tendencies? Would it rely on a horizontalist understanding of organization? And would it confront two reactionary forces (inside and outside power) that are each organized in coherent and unified hierarchical structures?
Such a horizontal and quasi-forum structure would be little more than a joke when set against the organized enemy. Its inefficiency and failure could be predicted from the outset.
But suppose a different form of organization is intended. Suppose it recognizes the necessity of a combined struggle (open, clandestine, and semi-open/semi-clandestine). Suppose it acknowledges the need for security measures, discipline, and therefore a solid vertical structure. Even then, the absence of the precondition of “coherence” would pose a serious obstacle.
Which individuals, with which tendencies, and on what criteria would be placed in the various bodies embedded in the hierarchical structure of the front?
Would one or several “individuals” from each tendency be appointed or elected to the leadership?
Would these unorganized individuals artificially and mechanically set aside their differences regarding political practice, the subject of liberation, and the horizon of struggle? Would they settle for a minimal common denominator to guide activities from beginning to end?
Or would such a body become the most fertile ground for fragmentation, incoherence, scattered action, and the sterilization of struggle?
We must be clear: the “unorganized individual” brings their entire political nature and existence into the front. Either they dissolve that political identity within the front (in which case the very concept of a coalition of different tendencies loses meaning), or they inevitably enter into serious friction with other political identities within the leadership. In that case, the coherence and discipline necessary for organized leadership would be paralyzed.
By contrast, a political organization that enters and participates in a united struggle preserves its own nature, existence, and distinct activities. As noted earlier, it places part of its organizational capacities at the disposal of the front within a defined framework and for defined goals.
We thus arrive at a related question. What will become of the hegemonic struggles within the front? Such struggles are inevitable. They are a constitutive part of any front activity.
Should we respond romantically and imagine that, for the first time in history, a front will be formed without internal hegemonic battles?
Or should we be realistic and admit that those individuals whose political tendency is more compatible with the dominant order, the prevailing ideology, and the discourse of major media will gradually become hegemonic within the front? And that they will absorb the other tendencies?
The problem, then, is not that a section of the revolutionary left is entering into an anti-fascist coalition or front with other forces. The reality is that a group of “individuals” who consider themselves part of the revolutionary left will cease to be revolutionary left. (Here, the revolutionary left matters not as an identity, but as an uncompromising line against fascism.)
This outcome goes beyond good intentions or sincere aspirations. It is the logical and practical result of an approach that removes the requirement of “political standing” as a condition for entering a united front.
Such political standing can only be achieved through a revolutionary organization. Yet the forces described in the second case are not organizations. They are not even circles. They are scattered individuals, or at best loose gatherings. Inevitably, they will dissolve their political and ideological tendency into a common platform shared with other forces.
Some of these individuals have, for some time, honestly clarified their position in public. They have openly declared their break with the revolutionary left.
Others have remained silent or kept the matter ambiguous. This is not necessarily due to a lack of sincerity in their political stance or practice. In some cases, it is precisely because they still sincerely consider themselves committed to revolutionary left politics.
We recognize the concern of this latter group to form an anti-fascist fighting front at this historical moment. As stated at the beginning of this text, we do not ignore the logical and historical reasons behind this concern.
However, we firmly believe that the requirements and preconditions of such a decision cannot be bypassed. The most important of these is political-organizational standing for meaningful and effective participation in the front. (This assumes that what is meant is truly a fighting front, not merely an intellectual or propagandistic alliance.)
The issue becomes even more urgent and complex when we acknowledge that, during the recent wave of protests in Iran, part of the class subjects of revolutionary left struggle were captured by Pahlavist reaction. Out of desperation, they chanted slogans against their own class, social, and political interests. Some even lost their lives in this path.
Whatever explanation we offer for this painful reality, the primary responsibility lies with the revolutionary left. Over all these years, especially since December 2017 uprising, it neither sought nor managed to intervene in an organized and strategic manner. It failed to play its historical role in articulating an emancipatory horizon for these subjects.
This responsibility, in different forms and degrees, weighs on all of “us” who identify with the revolutionary left. None of us can absolve ourselves of this fault.
Therefore, the immediate and historical task of the revolutionary left at this moment is, above all, to reclaim these class subjects from the camp of reaction.
This task cannot be carried out by the other hypothetical forces within a united anti-fascist front. Each of them has its own distinct political and class subjects. This task can be fulfilled only through the independent organization and organizing of the revolutionary left.
The conclusion is clear. The political standing of the revolutionary left for participation in such a front depends on the organized fulfillment of this independent task. Only then can it act as an effective and irreplaceable force within the front.
Finally, in defending the project of a “common front,” the revolutionary left must first answer simple but fundamental questions about its nature, function, and goal: Synergy or dissolution? Empowerment or sterilization? A fighting anti-fascist front, or an alliance of progressive intellectuals?
If the answers are “synergy,” “empowerment,” and “a fighting anti-fascist front,” then the revolutionary left must immediately place on its agenda the task it has postponed at least since December 2017 uprising: preparing for the founding of a revolutionary organization.
The path is difficult. The obstacles are many. But there is no shortcut.
February 2026
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